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The Optimal Precision of Administrative
Rules
Colin S. Divert
A state judge enjoins a liquor licensing board from denying future li-
cense applications until it adopts written rules to flesh out a vague "public
interest" standard.1 A federal court orders the Federal Communications
Commission to entertain requests for waivers from its "clear channel"
rules, noting that "a system where regulations are maintained inflexibly
without any procedure for waiver poses legal difficulties."'2 A congres-
sional committee studying federal bank chartering by the Comptroller of
the Currency assails the Comptroller's "reliance on vague standards
[which accord him] unbridled discretion in the chartering process."'
Meanwhile, two political scientists lament the increasing "imposition of
uniform regulatory requirements in situations where they do not make
sense.'
4
The common thread that connects these dissimilar complaints is dissat-
isfaction with the precision of administrative rules, because of either ad-
ministrative underprecision or excessive regulatory rigidity.5
This Article attempts to bring into sharper focus the assumptions and
concerns about regulatory precision implicit in these diverse opinions
about administrative policymaking. Those who take it upon themselves,
by choice or obligation, to judge the quality of administrative rules must
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P.2d 273 (1980) (Board of Dental Examiners had no grounds to revoke dentist's license because
"unprofessional conduct" was not defined in statute and no rule forbade conduct).
2. WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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determine the degree of formal precision to demand from their authors.
They need, to paraphase Judge Skelly Wright, a "standard for stan-
dards."6 The purpose of this Article is to fashion such a "standard for
standards" and to illustrate its applications and limitations.
The Article begins by defining the concept of rule "precision." Using
an example based on the FAA's mandatory retirement rule, I distinguish
three elements of regulatory precision-"transparency," "accessibility,"
and "congruence"-and explore the relationships among them. In Section
II, I develop criteria to determine the appropriate degree of regulatory
precision. I apply this analytical framework in Section III to the evalua-
tion of four very different administrative policies: the FAA's retirement
rule, the Comptroller of the Currency's standards for chartering national
banks, the Social Security Administration's grid rule for determining dis-
ability, and the Immigration Service's criteria for granting permanent res-
ident status for nonimmigrant aliens.
Section IV explores the model's applicability to administrative poli-
cymaking. This section discusses the two kinds of "administrative fail-
ure"-imperfect information and the divergence of social and private pref-
erences-that seem most likely to cause poorly drafted regulations. The
Article concludes by drawing lessons from this model for reviewing courts
faced with challenges to the precision of administrative rules.
I. THE CONCEPT OF RULE PRECISION
One would naturally expect the concept of rule precision to occupy a
central place in any coherent philosophy of law. Yet legal philosophers
differ considerably in both the relative significance they attach to formal
rules and the attributes of rules with which they are most concerned.
Commentators have identified a wide variety of parameters to describe
legal rules: generality and clarity," comprehensibility,8 accuracy of predic-
tion, 9 determinacy,' weight," value,' and consistency with social pur-
pose."3 Before we can begin to make useful prescriptions about the preci-
sion of administrative rules, we must give the concept some added
precision of its own.
6. Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice (Book Review), 81 YALE L.J. 575, 587 (1972) (reviewing
K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969)) ("We need, in short, some standards for when we
should require standards.").
7. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46-49, 63-65 (1964).
8. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121 (1961).
9. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 118-19 (1930).
10. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 24-26 (1977).
11. Id. at 26-28; Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 832-33 (1972).
12. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 419-21 (2d ed. 1977); Landes & Posner,
Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J. L. & ECON. 249, 263-64 (1976).
13. See Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 STAN. L. REV. 786, 822-24
(1967).
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A. Three Dimensions of Rules
The success of a rule in effecting its purpose largely depends on the
words a draftsman uses to express his intentions."' A rational rulemaker
will therefore be attentive to the probable effect of his choice of words
upon the rule's intended audience. First, he will want to use words with
well-defined and universally accepted meanings within the relevant com-
munity. I refer to this quality as "transparency." '15 Second, the rulemaker
will want his rule to be "accessible" to its intended audience-that is,
applicable to concrete situations without excessive difficulty or effort.1 Fi-
nally, of course, a policymaker will care about whether the substantive
content of the message communicated in his words produces the desired
behavior.1 7 The rule should, in other words, be "congruent" with the un-
derlying policy objective.18
One can see each of these objectives at work in contemporary debates
about the precision of legal rules. Transparency is the virtue chiefly cele-
brated in the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine, 9 as well as in judicial and
scholarly attacks on unconfined legislative delegation 0 nd administrative
14. Implicit in this assertion is a rejection of the "nihilist" view that legal texts have any meaning
that the reader chooses to assign to them. See Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 373,
373-77 (1982); Fish, Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 60 TEx. L. REv. 495, 503 (1982). I
assume, at a minimum, that the addressees of most administrative rules are a "community" whose
shared experiences or values can give objective (if not wholly deterministic) meaning to such texts. See
P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCI-
OLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 34-46 (1966); White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Litera-
ture, 60 Tax. L. REV. 415, 415-16 (1982).
15. Jerry Mashaw uses the term "transparency" to describe a similar idea. Mashaw, Administra-
tive Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REv. 885, 901 (1981). It is presuma-
bly this same notion that Hart has in mind when speaking of rules "which multitudes of individuals
could understand," H.L.A. HART, supra note 8, at 121, that Fuller has in mind when speaking of a
rule's "clarity," L. FULLER, supra note 7, at 63-65, and that Kennedy describes as "formal real-
izability," Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 1685,
1687-88 (1976).
16. See G. TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL: A PURE THEORY OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 180 (1980);
Brodley, In Defense of Presumptive Rules: An Approach to Legal Rulemaking for Conglomerate
Mergers, in THE CONGLOMERATE CORPORATION: AN ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS SYMPO-
SlUM 249, 255-60 (1981).
17. For a graphic representation of this point, see Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of
the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 346-49 (1949) (discussing passage of a hypothetical law for sterili-
zation of suspected hereditary criminals); see also Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 440 (1982)
(defining "specificity" of a classification as its degree of "over or underinclusive[ness]" in serving
legitimate political ends).
18. I use the term "congruent" in a sense similar to that used by Paul Brest. P. BRarST,
PROCESSES OF CONSTrruTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 478, 480 (1975); cf. L.
FULLER, supra note 7, at 81 (using "congruence" to refer to the fit between the law as written and
the law as applied).
19. See generally Note, The Voidfor-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67 (1960) (examining cases where void-for-vagueness doctrine was invoked).
20. "See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, J.,
concurring).
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discretion."1 The asserted defect of an academic "misconduct" standard,
for instance, was its failure to provide a sufficiently clear guide for stu-
dents' behavior.22 The desire to make legal rules more accessible motivates
recurrent calls for "simplification" of convoluted regimes like the tax
code.28 This urge also animates proposals to expand the use of per se rules
to resolve complex issues of antitrust law.24 On the other hand, the con-
cern primarily evoked by "irrebuttable presumption"2 5 and "required
waiver"26 claims is congruence. A rule that makes eligibility for disability
insurance turn on one's birth date, the argument runs, fails adequately to
discriminate between those who are capable and those who are incapable
of supporting themselves.27 Since any criterion for evaluating the "preci-
sion" of administrative rules should include these three values, it would be
tempting simply to define as "precise" a rule that combined the virtues of
transparency, accessibility, and congruence. But two formidable obstacles
lie in the path of such a venture-measurement and tradeoffs.
B. The Problem of Measurement
We must ask initially how to translate the goals of transparency, acces-
sibility, and congruence into usable criteria for evaluating specific rules.
To sketch the dimensions of that task, I offer a simple illustration.28 Im-
21. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 52-96 (1969).
22. Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1969).
23. See, e.g., Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1974);
Brannon, Simplification and Other Tax Objecthes, in FEDERAL INCOME TAX SIMPLIFICATION 191
(C. Gustafson ed. 1979); Woodworth, Tax Simplification and the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 34 LAW
& CONTEMP. PRoas. 711, 711, 713 (1969).
24. See Posner, The Next Step i the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Le-
gality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 23 (1981) (arguing for per se legality of vertical restraints in distribu-
tion absent inter-retailer cartels).
25. See generally Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1534 (1974) (examining constitutional underpinnings of irrebuttable presumption doctrine).
26. The required waiver cases examine the extent to which agencies may use bright-line rules to
close off an individual's right to a hearing. See Aman, Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Excep-
tions to Administrative Rules, 1982 DUmE L.J. 277. Early decisions upheld the practice, but implied
that agencies had to afford adversely affected persons an opportunity to seek a waiver from their
terms. Although the Supreme Court has refused to read that implication as a universal requirement,
FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.
192, 205 (1956); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224-25 (1943), the strug-
gle to accommodate individual justice with mechanical rules continues, see, e.g., Matlovich v. Secre-
tary of Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (requiring greater flexibility in Air Force
disciplinary rules); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 689-91 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (requiring greater flexibility in FTC trade regulations), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974);
WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1157-59 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (requiring greater flexibility in
FCC clear channel rules).
27. See Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1360 (11th Cir. 1982) (absence of scientific support for
age-based regulations supports case-by-case determination of physical ability to do job).
28. The illustration is drawn from the "age-60" pilot retirement rule, 24 Fed. Reg. 9776 (1959),
upheld, Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 898 (2d Cir. 1960). The current rule is
virtually identical to the original: "No person may serve as a pilot on an airplane engaged in [com-
mercial] operations. . . if that person has reached his 60th birthday." 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1982).
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agine a policymaker who must establish certification criteria for commer-
cial aircraft pilots. One aspect of that task is to define the circumstances
under which a pilot, once certified, should no longer be eligible to serve in
that capacity. Let us suppose our lawmaker has a rough idea of a policy
objective: pilots should retire when the social cost of allowing them to
continue, measured as the risk of accidents that they might cause multi-
plied by their consequences, exceeds the social benefit, measured as the
costs avoided by not having to find and train a replacement. But how can
the lawmaker capture this idea in a legal standard?
Let us initially offer three alternative verbal formulations for such a
rule:
Model I: No person may pilot a commercial airplane after his sixti-
eth birthday.
Model II: No person may pilot a commercial airplane if he poses an
unreasonable risk of an accident.
Model III: No person may pilot a commercial airplane if he falls
within one of the following categories. (There follow tables display-
ing all combinations of values for numerous variables, including
years and level of experience, hours of air time logged, age, height,
weight, blood pressure, heart rate, eyesight, and other vital signs,
that would disqualify a pilot from further eligibility to pilot
aircraft.)29
Which formulation is most transparent? The answer is easy: Model I.
Everyone knows exactly what the words "sixtieth" and "birthday" mean.
The crucial concept of Model II-"unreasonable" risk-seems, by con-
trast, susceptible to widely varying interpretations. Suppose, however, that
among the rule's intended audience, the term "unreasonable risk of acci-
dent" had acquired a very special meaning: namely, "older than 60." In
that case, the two rules would be equally transparent. That contingency,
however implausible here, nonetheless reminds us of the danger of judging
a rule's transparency without looking beyond its words to its actual'
impact.
The danger inherent in facial evaluation is even more evident in apply-
ing the other two criteria. Is the rule of Model II or Model III more
accessible? The former is shorter and more memorable. It also apparently
requires only a single judgment-the "reasonableness" of the risk. That
29. For a review of some possible parameters, see NAT'L INST. ON AGING, DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERv., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON AGING PANEL ON THE EX.PER-
IENCED PILOT STUDY (August 1981) [hereinafter cited as NIA REPORT]. For promulgated illustra-
tions of such tables, see 20 C.F.R. subpt. P, app. 2 (1982) (Social Security Adminsitration grid rule
for ditermining disability); 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1982) (U.S. Parole Commission parole release
guidelines).
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judgment, however, may well rest on a set of subsidiary inquiries as nu-
merous and complex as those encompassed within Model III's more ex-
plicit set of tables.
Similarly, our intuition that Model II is more congruent than, say,
Model I, may be unreliable. The facial resemblance between Model II
and the rulemaker's ultimate objective depends on the unverifiable as-
sumption that "unreasonable" connotes "economically inefficient."
It might be possible to assess these alternatives by reducing our three
values to some empirically measurable form. We could, for example, con-
duct an experiment in which we present a series of hypothetical questions
to a random sample of a rule's intended audience and require them to
apply it to specific situations." We might measure the rule's congruence
by the ratio of agreement between the respondents' answers and the
rulemaker's desired answers. We could use the ratio of internal agreement
among respondents to measure the rule's transparency. Finally, we could
construct an index of the rule's accessibility by assessing the average time
(or money, in a more realistic experiment) that respondents invest in ar-
riving at their answers. These measures, however, are at best only expen-
sive proxies for the values that underlie them.
C.' The Problem of Tradeoffs
Assuming that we could make reliable measurements along each of the
three dimensions, we would still have to find a way to aggregate them in
an overall evaluation. If transparency always correlated closely with ac-
cessibility and congruence, this would present no difficulty. Our three
models of a pilot retirement rule, however, suggest that it does not. Each
formulation has something to recommend it, but each also presents obvi-
ous difficulties. Model I may indeed be amenable to mechanical applica-
tion, but it will undoubtedly ground many pilots who should continue
flying and may allow some to continue who should be grounded. Even if
we concede that Model II is simple and faithful tot our policymaker's in-
tentions, it generates widely varying interpretations in individual cases.
Model III is commendably objective and may even discriminate accurately
between low and high risks. But it achieves this latter objective only at the
cost of difficulty in application.
Attempting to escape from these tradeoffs with a fourth option seems
hopeless. Suppose we begin with Model I's "age 60" version. Since this
rule's greatest flaw is its apparent incongruity, we might try to soften its
30. For a discussion of intelligibility, see Ross, On Legalities and Linguistics: Plain Language
Legislation, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 317, 334-35 (1981).
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hard edges by allowing exceptions in particularly deserving cases.31 We
could, for example, permit especially robust sexagenarians to continue fly-
ing. But this strategem merely poses a new riddle: how should we define
the category of exempt pilots? There are, of course, many choices, but all
of them seem to suffer in one degree or another from problems of opacity
(e.g., "reasonably healthy"), incongruence (e.g., "able to press 150 pounds
and run five miles in 40 minutes"), or inaccessibility (Model III's tables).
Similarly, starting from Model II's "unreasonable risk" standard, we
could increase its transparency by appending a list of the components of
"unreasonable risk"-for example, "taking into consideration the person's
age, physical condition, mental alertness, skill and experience." Yet such
laundry lists add relatively little transparency when both the meaning and
relative weights of the enumerated terms remain unspecified. Providing
the necessary specification, however, makes the standard less congruent or
accessible.
II. THE OPTIMAL DEGREE OF REGULATORY PRECISION
The observation that various verbal formulations are likely to involve
differing mixes of transparency, accessibility, and congruence offers little
solace to a regulatory draftsman. Tradeoffs may be inevitable, but not all
tradeoffs are equally acceptable. What our rulemaker needs is a normative
principle for comparing formulations.
Invocation of moral values like fairness, equity, or community offers
little promise. Each dimension of regulatory precision implicates impor-
tant moral principles. Transparent rules help to assure equality by defin-
ing when people are "similarly situated"' "a and divorcing the outcome of
an official determination from the decisionmakers. An accessible rule, by
contrast, promotes communal and "dignitary" values by enabling mem-
bers of its audience to participate in its application to their individual
circumstances."3 Congruence directly fosters the law's substantive moral
aims by promoting outcomes in individual cases consistent with those
aims.
These principles frequently work at cross-purposes, however, precisely
31. For a detailed account of the difficulties inherent in administering an exceptions policy, see
Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity, the Exceptions Process, and the
Formulation of Energy Policy (Feb. 16, 1983) (Discussion Draft Report to the Admin. Conf. of the
U.S.) (exceptions to federal petroleum price and allocation rules).
32. But see Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 543-48 (1982) (equal
treatment of equals constitutes a tautology).
33. See Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Structural jus-
tice?, 92 HARV. L. REv. 864, 869-70 (1979); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 269, 283-88, 295-98 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Tribe, Structural Due Process]. On "digni-
tary" talues, see Mashaw, supra note 15; Saphire, Specijfing Due Process Values: Toward a More
Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 117-25 (1978).
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because tradeoffs occur along the three dimensions of precision. A per-
fectly transparent rule ("no person with a surname ending in a vowel may
be a pilot") may assure similar treatment of categorically similar cases,
but it may also fail to provide defensible applications. A morally congru-
ent rule ("immorality is prohibited") can be too vague to satisfy the moral
imperatives of fair warning and meaningful participation. A perfectly
transparent and congruent rule may be so cumbersome as to deprive its
audience of fair warning.
A. An Efficiency Criterion for Rule Precision
Since tradeoffs among values are unavoidable, the morally sensitive
rulemaker must reduce those conflicting values to some common denomi-
nator. One candidate is the currency of welfare economics-"social util-
ity."'34 A social utility-maximizing rulemaker would, for any conceivable
set of rule formulations, identify and estimate the social costs and benefits
flowing from each, and select the one with the greatest net social benefit.
Subject to a constraint on his rulemaking budget or authority, the
rulemaker would continue adding to his stock of rules so long as the mar-
ginal social benefit of the last increment exceeded its marginal cost.35
We can use our pilot retirement rule to sketch the dimensions of this
task. Suppose our hypothetical policymaker wants to decide whether
Model I or Model II is socially preferable. Several considerations argue in
favor of Model I. It may, for example, produce a higher level of voluntary
compliance, since the rulemaker can more readily charge pilots with its
enforcement. For this reason, pilots are less likely to evade or sabotage the
rule.
Model I also seems cheaper to enforce. Since it increases accuracy of
prediction, there will be fewer requests for interpretation. Since it in-
creases the level of compliance, there will be fewer violations to process.
And since it is highly objective, the enforcement agency can quickly and
accurately resolve the disputes that do arise. Model II, by contrast, will
generate numerous and expensive conflicts. In the absence of clear stan-
dards, factfinding and offers of proof will range far and wide. The rule's
audience will expend effort in interpreting the meaning of the standard
and in making successive elaborations of its meaning in individual cases.
The increased compliance and reduced litigation are counterproductive,
however, if a rule induces the wrong result. The age-60 rule will deprive
34. On the conceptual difficulties in measurement of social utility, see Coleman, Efficiey, Utility,
and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980); Posner, Utilitarianismn, Economics, and
Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STrD. 103, 112-17 (1979).
35. See G. TULLOCK, supra note 16; Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemak-
ing, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
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society of the services of safe, experienced sexagenarians. Even the claim
that Model I has lower transaction costs must be tempered with skepti-
cism. Arbitrary rules invite demands for modification. Proponents of
Model I will spend their days defending the rule and may in the end
accede to some exceptions. Processing petitions for waiver will consume
many of the same social resources required for the administration of
Model II.
Varying the degree of precision with which a rule is expressed can have
an impact on both the primary behavior of the rule's audience and the
transaction costs associated with administering the rule.36 Refining these
concepts further, one can identify four principal subcategories of potential
costs and benefits:
1. Rate of Compliance.-Increased precision may increase compli-
ance and decrease evasion or concealment costs. First, it will reduce
the cost of determining the rule's application to an actor's intended
conduct. Second, the ease of enforcing transparent rules discourages
would-be violators from making costly (and, from society's view-
point, wasteful) efforts to avoid compliance. Increasing a rule's
transparency may, however, eventually reduce compliance by in-
creasing the cost of locating and applying the applicable provision,
i.e., increasing the rule's inaccessibility and incongruence.
2. Over- and Under-Inclusiveness.-Increasing the transparency
of a rule may increase the variance between intended and actual out-
comes. The rulemaker may be unable to predict every consequence
of applying the rule or to foresee all of the circumstances to which it
may apply. While the rulemaker presumably can change the rule
after learning of its incongruence, the process of amendment is costly
and gives rise to social losses in the interim. On the other hand, a
more opaque rule, though facially congruent, may be under- or over-
inclusive in application, because its vagueness invites misinterpreta-
tion. Increasing a rule's transparency may therefore substitute errors
of misspecification for errors of misapplication.
3. Costs of Rulemaking.-Rulemaking involves two sorts of social
costs: the cost of obtaining and analyzing information about the
rule's probable impact, and the cost of securing agreement among
participants in the rulemaking process. These costs usually rise with
increases in a rule's transparency since objective regulatory line-
drawing increases the risk of misspecification and sharpens the focus
of value conflicts. Yet, greater initial precision can also reduce the
need for future rulemaking by leaving fewer policy questions open
for later resolution by amendment or case-by-case elaboration.
36. The classification used here is based loosely on that used by Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 35.
See also Gifford, Communication of Legal Standards, Policy Development, and Effective Conduct
Regulltion, 56 CORNELL L. Rav. 409, 466 (1971) (discussing "three-way relationship between re-
source expenditures, effectiveness of control, and substantive standards").
The Yale Law Journal
4. Cost of Applying a Rule.-The cost to both the regulated popu-
lation and enforcement officials of applying a rule tends to increase
as the rule's opacity or inaccessibility increases. Transparent and ac-
cessible rules can reduce the number of disputes that arise and sim-
plify their resolution by causing the parties' predictions of the out-
come to converge.
Having identified the costs and benefits associated with alternative rule
formulations, the optimizing rulemaker computes the net social cost or
benefit of each and selects the version generating the greatest net benefit.
B. Balancing the Factors
Classifying the consequences of alternative rules in this way helps iden-
tify situations in which one factor may exert especially strong pressures
for transparency, accessibility, or congruence. The rate of compliance, for
example, is an especially important consideration in the analysis of rules
regulating socially harmful conduct. This factor supports use of highly
transparent and accessible standards. By "strictly" construing the lan-
guage used in criminal statutes according to its most widely accepted
meaning, for example, courts enhance the transparency of the criminal
law.'7 One would similarly expect a high degree of transparency in the
rules used to define easily concealable regulatory offenses such as unsafe
transportation of hazardous chemicals, 8 unauthorized entry into the
country,3 9 or overharvesting fisheries. 0
Concerns about over- or under-inclusiveness dominate when errors of
misclassification are particularly costly. The First Amendment "over-
breadth" doctrine, for example, reflects a belief that speech often has a
higher value to society than to the individual speaker."1 Similarly, the Su-
preme Court's concern about excessively rigid death penalty statutes re-
flects the very high cost it assigns to erroneous executions.42 Less dramatic
examples also abound in administrative regulation. For example, the so-
37. See Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112-13 (1979); Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction
of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 748, 756-62 (1935).
38. See COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., PROGRAMS FOR ENSURING THE SAFE TRANSPORTA-
TION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS NEED IMPROVEMENT (Nov. 4, 1980); COMPTROLLER GEN. OF
THE U.S., FEDERAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF NUCLEAR
MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION (May 7, 1979).
39. See COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., PROSPECTS DIM FOR EFFECTIVELY ENFORCING IM-
MIGRATION LAWS (Nov. 5, 1980).
40. See COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS HINDER EFFECTIVE IM-
PLEMENTATION OF NEW FISHERY MANAGEMENT AcTIVrTEs (Sept. 12, 1979); COMPTROLLER
GEN. OF THE U.S., PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT UNDER THE FISHERY
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT (Jan. 9, 1979).
41. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1980); Good-
ing v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); cf. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 1 (discussing
overbreadth as specific instance of challenge to third-party effects of rules).
42. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); Black, Due Process for Death, 26
Vol. 93: 65, 1983
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cial impact of discharging a given quantity of a pollutant into a stream
can vary widely from industry to industry (because of variations in costs
of prevention) or from stream to stream (because of variations in harm
caused).," Where the costs of over- or under-inclusiveness are high, ra-
tional policymakers will favor highly flexible or intricate regulatory
formulas.
The costs of applying rules often loom especially large in the formula-
tion of standards designed to govern a large volume of disputes. In these
situations a desire to minimize litigation costs by using bright-line rules
may outweigh countervailing considerations. Thus, agencies with particu-
larly crowded enforcement dockets tend to adopt the most transparent
rules." A related transaction cost is incurred in controlling the behavior of
persons charged with a policy's enforcement. Numerous scholars have
documented the difficulties of controlling the behavior of police officers
and other officials applying law at the "street level."' 5 In occupational
safety and health regulation or administration of the tax laws, which de-
pend on large decentralized enforcement staffs, the costs of applying rules
often push rules to a highly transparent extreme.'6
The cost of rulemaking may assume particular saliency in a collegial
rulemaking body such as a legislature or multi-member independent
agency. 47 The larger the number of participants and the more divergent
their values, the greater will be the cost of reaching agreement. One
would therefore expect collegial rulemakers to favor formulas like Model
II, which minimize the range of agreement required. This effect is espe-
cially pronounced if the subsequent process of elaborating such open-en-
ded rules has fewer participants.
The implication of this analysis is that optimal precision varies from
CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 12 (1976); Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Pro-
cess for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1150 (1980).
43. See, e.g., Harrison, Regulation and Distribution, in ATTACKING REGULATORY PROBLEMS
185, 188-91, 200-01 (A. Ferguson ed. 1981); Spence & Weitzman, Regulatory Strategies for Pollu-
lion Control, in APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION 199, 204-11 (A. Friedlaender ed.
1978).
44. See Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal Administra-
live Agencies, in ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, 1979, at 203,
223-83 (of four agencies studied, the Mine Safety and Health Adminstration, with the largest
caseload, had the most transparent penalty standard).
45. See, e.g., M. LIPSKY, STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 145-46, 163-69 (1980) (private goal
definition and unaccountability of police); J. PROTTAS, PEOPLE PROCESSING: THE STREET-LEVEL
BUREAUCRAT IN PUBLIC SERVICE BUREAUCRACIES (1979) (describing behavior in welfare depart-
ments, public housing offices, hospitals, etc.); J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 57-82
(1968) (discussing police administration of patrolmen).
46. See Nichols & Zeckhauser, Government Comes to the Workplace: An Assessment of OSHA,
PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1977, at 39, 49; Smith, Protecting Workers' Health and Safely, in INSTEAD OF
REGULATION: ALTERNATIVES TO FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 311, 313-14 (R. Poole, Jr. ed.
1982).
47. Cf. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 35, at 267.
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rule to rule. The degree of precision appropriate to any particular rule
depends on a series of variables peculiar to the rule's author, enforcer, and
addressee. As a consequence, generalizations about optimal rule precision
are inherently suspect. Nonetheless, one can use this framework to draw
some general inferences about the relative precision of different types of
rules. In the remainder of this section, I offer three illustrations based on
distinctions between external and internal rules, between liability and
sanctioning standards, and between prohibitory and licensure rules.
C. Internal vs. External Rules
Administrative rulemakers typically promulgate two kinds of rules:
"external" rules addressed principally to the regulated public, and "inter-
nal" rules, addressed to persons charged with the enforcement of the ex-
ternal rules.4 There is often a substantial difference in the content of the
two types of rules. Sometimes an internal rule directly contradicts an ex-
ternal rule."9 More commonly, internal rules seek to establish priorities
for the allocation of resources to the enforcement of facially absolute
commands.
Since they are addressed to different audiences and serve different func-
tions, the two types of rules would be expected to have a different degree
of precision. Because internal standards are fashioned to allocate re-
sources, 50 concerns about incongruity will weigh heavily in the rule for-
mulation. The socially optimal allocation of scarce prosecutorial resources,
for instance, is a monumentally complicated matter, turning on a wide
variety of factors.51 Simple, transparent rules may, therefore, grossly mis-
allocate resources.
The putative gains from using transparent language, moreover, are
likely to be smaller in the context of internal rules. Agency personnel are
typically more homogeneous than the regulated public. The selection,
training, and socialization of enforcement staff reduce the need to rely on
internal standards to supply the education and motivation often provided
by external standards. Since the audience for internal rules is also subject
to more continuous and intensive supervision, the compliance-inducing
function of rule precision is similarly less important.
These considerations provide support for the judiciary's customary re-
48. See id. at 261; cf. H.L.A. HART, supra note 8, at 77-96 (distinguishing "primary" from
"secondary" rules).
49. Cf R. KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY 155-56 (1980) (FTC de-emphasis of
Robinson-Patman Act prosecutions).
50. See A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 59-63 (1967).
51. See Diver, A Theory of Regulatory Enforcement, 28 PuB. POLICY 257, 286-91 (1980); Rabin,
Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24
STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1044-72 (1972).
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luctance to interfere with the "internal management" of administrative
agencies.52 Courts have displayed a great tolerance toward opaque
prosecutorial policies,53 for example, despite frequent academic calls for
reform.5 4 Our analysis cautions us not to be dismayed at this condition. It
also suggests a basis for explaining occasional deviations from this defer-
ential posture. The Supreme Court has, for instance, required most inves-
tigative agencies to establish relatively transparent policies for the conduct
of regulatory inspections. 55 Although such policies allocate internal inves-
tigative resources, they also regulate external conduct by instructing in-
spectors what to inspect and by advising regulated entities what to make
available for inspection. Because most inspectors' work occurs at remote
locations, moreover, close personal supervision is not a practical substitute
for detailed written guidance.56
D. Sanctioning vs. Liability Rules
Rules defining standards of criminal conduct tend to be relatively pre-
cise,57 while rules for determining appropriate punishment tend to be
opaque.58 A similar divergence has been observed in civil regulation. 59
Our framework suggests a basis for both this disparity and for the ex-
treme deference that reviewing courts have accorded to administrative
sanctioning decisions.60
52. Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (dictum);
see, e.g., Greater New York Hosp. Ass'n v. Mathews, 536 F.2d 494, 497-98 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting
unreviewability of HEW Secretary's decision to change mode of reimbursement for Medicare services
rendered by hospitals); Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 444 (2d Cir. 1969) (noting unreviewability
of Veterans Administration research grant).
53. See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (refusing to require prosecution of
parent for failure to support illegitimate child); FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244 (1967)
(holding FTC's refusal to withhold enforcement of cease-and-desist order did not constitute patent
abuse of discretion). But cf. Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (requir-
ing HEW enforcement of Title VII against educational institutions); American Pub. Health Ass'n v.
Veneman, 349 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1972) (requiring FDA to release reports on efficacy of drugs
and set deadlines for completion of further evaluations of efficacy).
54. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 162-87; Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1560-72 (1981).
55. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978) (search must be "pursuant to an
administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria"); see also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967) (requiring administrative subpoena to inspect warehouse); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967) (requiring search warrants for nonemergency building inspection).
56. See, e.g., K. HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT chs. 7-8; J. WILSON, THE IN-
VESTIGATORS: MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS AGENTS 25 (1978).
57. See R. POSNER, supra note 12, at 425.
58. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973); P.
O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM:
AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 3 (1977).
59. Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1457-59 (1979).
60. E.g., Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182 (1973); Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Org. v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 54 AD. L. REP. 2d 1, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Nowicki v. United States, 536 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977).
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First, many policymakers feel that encouraging compliance-an impor-
tant function of precision-has little application to sanctioning standards.
This sentiment in part reflects the modest range of most regulatory sanc-
tions. When the range of options is known to be small, the njarginal bene-
fit of greater precision is commensurately small. Indeed, many regulators
believe that imprecision is a better deterrent than precision, where actual
penalties are modest.6"
Drafters of sanctioning standards also face problems with congruence.
The imposition of sanctions may serve several different objectives simulta-
neously such as general deterrence, special deterrence, compensation, ret-
ribution, incapacitation, or rehabilitation." Tailoring a standard to fit the
relevant mix of objectives is often, difficult. Even if one accepts general
deterrence as the sole objective, the task is not greatly simplified. Effective
deterrence demands a penalty based on the perceived probability of detec-
tion and conviction, the net gain to the violator from his violation, and the
nonpenalty cost of violation." The same act, committed by different actors
under different circumstances, may warrant widely divergent sanctions.
Any transparent rule, therefore, is likely to produce both underdeterrence
(by generating too low a penalty in many cases) and overdeterrence (by
generating too high a penalty in others).
The distinction between liability rules and sanctioning rules is most ap-
parent, however, in the area of transaction costs. Liability rules must be
interpreted by the regulated population as well as persons involved in
every level of enforcement. Since sanctioning rules apply only after a pre-
liminary finding of liability, they are typically applied by a smaller group
of officials (prosecutors and arbiters) and in a drastically reduced number
of cases. As a consequence, the cost of applying sanctioning rules is
smaller than the cost of applying liability rules.
The foregoing analysis suggests that, as a general rule, drafters of sanc-
tioning rules will be less willing to compromise congruence to attain
transparency and accessibility than drafters of liability rules. The analysis
also suggests the proper characteristics to look for in seeking exceptions to
this general tendency. For example, the larger the number of enforcement
officials involved in the sanctioning process-and the greater the resulting
61. See Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding The Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1, 29 (1971); Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforce-
ment, 72 COLuM. L. REv. 1293, 1297 (1972).
62. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINs, DETERRENCE 71-90 (1973).
63. See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcoN. 169 (1968);
Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and the Magnitude of Fines, 69
AM. ECON. REv. 880 (1979); Stigler, The Optimumn Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL ECON. 526, 530
(1970).
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cost of policing their conduct-the more transparent one would expect
sanctioning rules to be. This helps to explain why agencies with huge
caseloads and a highly decentralized enforcement process, like the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration"' or the Mine Safety and
Health Administration, 5 have detailed penalty standards.
E. Licensure Standards vs. Prohibitory Rules
A third type of disparity explained by our analysis is the tendency of
policymakers to formulate less transparent standards for issuing licenses
than for direct prohibitions or commands,"" Licensure rules do not prima-
rily deter or influence conduct. Rather, they seek to facilitate predictions
about future conduct. They are, in this sense, addressed more to licensing
officials than to the regulated population.
Licensure rules, moreover, are likely to pose greater difficulties in at-
taining congruence than liability rules because they tend to address rela-
tively large and complex phenomena-such as the entry of a new competi-
tor into an existing market-rather than isolated acts or omissions.
Accurate estimation of social impact is bound to be correspondingly com-
plex in scope and difficulty. Some licensing rules, moreover, seek to facili-
tate relative, rather than absolute, judgments. The question is not simply,
"Is A socially beneficial?" but rather, "Which, among A, B, C, etc., is
most socially beneficial?" Simple, transparent rules seem particularly
prone to error in sorting out such calculations.6 7
A comparison of transaction costs in licensing and direct-conduct regu-
lation yields an indeterminate result. Licensure cases are relatively infre-
quent because they deal with much lumpier issues. Yet such cases typi-
cally involve substantial individual stakes, because foreclosure from the
licensed activity may involve substantial opportunity costs in foregone
earnings.
These factors should induce drafters of licensing standards to give more
weight to congruence and less to transparency and accessibility than do
the authors of prohibitory rules. One would expect the strongest pressure
for transparency in matters like occupational licensure or licensing motor
vehicle operators, which involve a large volume of individual determina-
tions, each having small social significance. In these settings, pressure to
reduce transaction costs would push standards more in the direction of
transparency, notwithstanding the cost in over- or under-inclusiveness.
64. See OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL 81-93.
65. See 30 C.F.R. § 100.3 (1982); Diver, supra note 59, at 1447-52.
66. See Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Re-
form, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549, 575-76 (1979).
67. See G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBirr, TRAGIC CHOICES 72 (1978).
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III. FOUR CASE STUDIES OF RULE PRECISION
The foregoing categorical comparisons illustrate the insights that one
can derive by using an efficiency model to evaluate rule precision. But
insights at so high a level of generality provide little useful guidance to
rulemakers and their overseers. The acid test for the efficiency criterion is
its ability to support confident judgments about the precision of particular
regulatory formulations.
To test the utility of our "precision calculus" as an evaluative frame-
work, I apply it in this section to four specific administrative rules: the
Federal Aviation Administration's retirement policy for commercial pilots,
the Comptroller of the Currency's criteria for chartering national banks,
the Social Security Administration's "grid" rules for disability determina-
tion, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service's standards for
awarding permanent resident status to nonimmigrant aliens. The first
three illustrate the three prototypical models sketched in Section I. Al-
though the relative precision of each has been the subject of considerable
public controversy, my analysis suggests that each represents a rational
response to the particular demands of its regulatory context. The fourth
case study, by contrast, highlights an administrative standard whose flaws
fall into clear relief under the light of the precision framework.
A. The Pilot Retirement Rule
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 authorized the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) "to promote safety of flight of civil aircraft," giving
"full consideration to the duty resting upon air carriers to perform their
services with the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest.""
Among the more specific charges, the law instructed the FAA to develop
"[r]easonable rules and regulations governing,.in the interest of safety, the
maximum hours or periods of service of airmen . . . ."" The Act evinced
a single-minded concern for the safety of air transportation.
As part of its program to implement the Act, the FAA promulgated the
"age 60 rule" in 1959: "No individual who has reached his 60th birthday
shall be utilized or serve as a pilot on any aircraft while engaged in air
carrier operations." ' In explaining the basis for the rule, the FAA Ad-
ministrator expressed concern about the "progressive deterioration of cer-
tain important physiological and psychological functions. '7 1 Although the
agency conceded that "available data do not permit any precise determina-
68. 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)-1421(b) (1976).
69. Id. § 1421(a)(5).
70. 24 Fed. Reg. 9773 (1959). For the current version, see supra note 28.
71. 24 Fed. Reg. 5247 (1959) (notice of proposed rulemaking).
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tion of the specific age at which continued activity as a pilot can be said
conclusively to constitute a hazard to safety under normal or emergency
conditions of flight,"'72 it chose a cutoff at age 60 for lack of any more
defensible alternative.
7 3
The rule has drawn recurrent criticism for its overinclusiveness. The
rule's earliest and, until recently, most persistent critic was the Air Line
Pilots Association (ALPA). After unsuccessfully opposing the rule's initial
adoption,7 4 ALPA turned to the courts for relief. Its challenge to the rule's
rationality in ALPA v. Quesada75 failed, however, producing instead this
characteristically deferential judicial response: "It is not the business of
courts to substitute their untutored judgment for the expert knowledge of
those who are given authority to implement the general directives of Con-
gress."'7 6 Subsequent efforts to enlist judicial support in the attack on the
rule have proved equally unavailing. Encouraged by a suggestive footnote
in the Quesada case,77 several pilots petitioned the FAA for exemption
from the retirement rule pursuant to a statutory provision that authorizes
the Administrator to "grant exemptions . . . if he finds that such action
would be in the public interest." 78 The FAA has, however, promptly de-
nied all petitions for exemption without hearing and has been uniformly
upheld on appeal.79
Having failed to secure relief from the agency or the courts, ALPA
approached Congress. After a decade of unsuccessful lobbying, ALPA fi-
nally persuaded Congress to direct a study of the rule's medical justifica-
tion by the National Institutes of Health.80 But the study panel's report,
released two years later, concluded that the rule should be retained.81 Af-
ter examining a wide array of medical and performance simulation tests,
the panel found none able to predict loss of function with sufficient accu-
racy to replace the simple age criterion.82
The age 60 rule is pure Model I: almost perfectly transparent and ele-
72. Id. at 5249.
73. Id. at 9772.
74. See Comment, Mandatory Retirement of Airline Pilots: An Analysis of the FAA's Age 60
Retirement Rule, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 245-46 (1981).
75. 276 F.2d 892, 898 (2d Cir. 1960).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 898 n.10.
78. 49 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (1976).
79. Keating v. FAA, 610 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1979); Gray v. FAA, 594 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1979);
Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1978); see also O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (finding no requirement for adjudicatory hearing in denying petitions to revoke age 60 rule).
80. Pub. L. No. 96-171, 93 Stat. 1285 (1979) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (Supp. V 1980)).
81. NIA REPORT, supra note 29. The report acknowledged that "there is no convincing medical
evidence to support age 60, or any other specific age, for mandatory pilot retirement." Id. at 2. But it
did conclude, from examining "available actuarial and epidemiological data," that the probability of
"accident attributed to acute or subtle incapacitation" of pilots would increase with pilot age. Id.
82. See id. at 4, 7.
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mentally simple. Model I formulations are likely to seem especially attrac-
tive when enforcement is particularly difficult or costly. This considera-
tion might have motivated the FAA in 1959, even though its official
explanation for the rule makes scant mention of it.8" Involuntary retire-
ment can exact a heavy toll on the unwilling pilot in forgone income84 and
loss of professional satisfaction or self-esteem. Many pilots might go to
considerable lengths to avoid the rule. A bright-line retirement standard
offers a promising way to minimize the costs of combatting evasion.
In fact, however, the risk of evasion could not have appeared substan-
tial. Piloting commercial aircraft is a visible activity, and the FAA could
count on the carriers to help it police any reasonable retirement policy.8 5
The transaction-cost savings argument is more telling. Disqualification
from piloting commercial aircraft is a sufficiently severe deprivation to
warrant a hearing of contested issues. Enforcement of a discretionary re-
tirement standard, consequently, could generate expensive proceedings in-
volving a high proportion of the pilots to whom it was applied. Although
the number of commercial pilots approaching retirement in 1959 was
small, the FAA correctly foresaw a substantial increase in their
numbers."'
Set against this modest saving in enforcement costs, one must consider
the incongruity losses occasioned by the use of a sharp dividing line. Pre-
maturely grounding healthy pilots can involve two complementary forms
of social cost: (1) the cost of training replacements, and (2) the additional
accidents caused by insufficiently trained replacements. At the time of the
rule's adoption, these costs did not appear particularly great. The airline
industry was beginning to introduce turbojet aircraft into commercial avi-
ation on a large scale in the late 1950's. Operation of the new aircraft,
even by experienced pilots, required extensive training. In fact, far from
being concerned about the cost of replacing experienced pilots, the FAA
expressed doubt whether any amount of retraining could break senior pi-
lots of old habits completely enough to assure proper response in
emergencies.
8 7
83. 24 Fed. Reg. 9772-73 (1959).
84. Today, pensions average about 50% of pre-retirement salaries. For captains employed by ma-
jor airlines, the resulting loss of income ranges from $30,000 to $50,000. NIA REPoRT, supra note
29, app. C, at C-73 to C-74 (statement of Air Transport Ass'n). The financial impact of retirement in
1959 was more severe since pensions were relatively less generous.
85. Air carriers, which generally wish to maintain good relations with the FAA, have consistently
supported mandatory retirement at age 60. See id. at C-51 (statement of Air Transport Ass'n).
86. See 24 Fed. Reg. 5248 (1959) (80 airline pilots expected to reach age 60 by 1962). In the
1980's, "between 500 and 1000 airline pilots will reach age 60 each year." Report of the Institute of
Medicine, Airline Pilot Age, Health and Performance: Scientific and Medical Considerations (Mar.
1981), in NIA REPORT, supra note 29, at F-32.
87. 24 Fed. Reg. 9773 (1959).
Vol. 93: 65, 1983
Optimal Administrative Precision
A second reason for the FAA's apparent disregard of incongruity costs
was the lack of any discriminant better than age."' Granted, the FAA
seemed to agree that age is only a crude proxy for incapacitating condi-
tions. But it does no good to bemoan the crudeness of that proxy unless a
better predictor can be found.
If the case for the rule's original adoption rests heavily on the introduc-
tion of turbojet aircraft and the infancy of medical science, what factors
justify the rule's retention in 1983? The calculus clearly has changed.
Transaction costs provide an even weightier argument for a Model I rule
now, with 500 to 1000 airline pilots reaching 60 each year.", Yet the
potential losses occasioned by a hard-and-fast age discriminant have also
increased. No dramatic revolution in aircraft technology threatens the pre-
sent generation of senior pilots with obsolescence. At an estimated cost of
$250,000" ° to train a new pilot, the replacement tradeoff begins to look
less favorable than it did in 1959.
Time has also eroded the "lack of alternatives" argument. Much
progess has been made in developing reliable measures for many impor-
tant physiological functions."' Yet, as testing techniques have become
more sophisticated, so has our appreciation of the conditions for successful
pilot performance. There remain more critical functions, especially intel-
lectual and psychological ones, for which no better discriminant than age
has been found.9 2 Recent progress in developing testing procedures, in
short, cannot guarantee the reduction in the volume of unnecessarily
grounded pilots that a more individualized screening process might ordi-
narily generate.
The ultimate balance is not easy to strike.93 One can say with assurance
only that in the twenty-four years since 1959, the stakes have risen on
both sides of the dispute. The number of skilled pilots languishing in pre-
mature retirement is unquestionably much greater today, but, then, so is
the number of lives that a more individualized screen would unavoidably
entrust to aging pilots with undetectable risks. In the weighing of such
imponderables, even a modest saving in transaction costs is justification
enough to retain the present rule.
B. National Bank Chartering Standards
Compared to the FAA's retirement rule, the criteria used by the Comp-
88. Id.
89. See supra note 86.
90. NIA REPORT, supra note 29, app. C, at C-37 (statement of Air Line Pilots Ass'n).
91. See id., app. F, at F-23 to F-26.
92. Id. at F-20.
93. For that very reason, the FAA's recent decison to reopen the issue for more systematic reap-
praisal is most welcome. See 47 Fed. Reg. 29,782 (1982) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking).
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troller of the Currency to charter national banks are a study in ambiguity.
The Comptroller of the Currency derives his authority to grant charters to
national banks from the National Bank Act of 1864.9' Throughout the
period since the Act's adoption, Comptrollers have made very little effort
to confine their virtually unrestricted statutory discretion by articulating
more precise criteria for chartering decisions. Prior to 1976, the Comp-
troller's published policy statements merely listed five factors that would
be investigated in the course of processing an application:
(1) The adequacy of the proposed bank's capital structure;
(2) The earning prospects of the proposed bank;
(3) The convenience and needs of the community to be served by
the proposed bank;
(4) The character and general standing in the community or [sic]
the applicants, prospective directors, proposed officers, and
other employees, and other persons connected with the applica-
tion or to be connected with the proposed bank; and
(5) The banking ability and experience of proposed officers and
other employees.95
Virtually no "common law" of bank chartering evolved, moreover, since
Comptrollers furnished little or no explanation for their decisions."
This state of extreme regulatory opacity led Professor Kenneth Scott, in
a 1975 study, to criticize the Comptroller for failing to "provide a clear
and consistent explanation of what he is doing."9 Based on Scott's report,
the Administrative Conference of the United States recommended that the
bank chartering agencies, including the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), "undertake to provide a full statement of their objec-
94. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified in relevant part at 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-27
(1976)). The only substantive standard for bank chartering in the Act is:
If. . . it appears that such association is lawfully entitled to commence the business of bank-
ing, the comptroller shall give to such association a certificate .... But the comptroller may
withhold from an association his certificate authorizing the commencement of business, when-
ever he has reason to suppose that the shareholders have formed the same for any other than
the legitimate objects contemplated by this chapter.
12 U.S.C. § 27 (1976).
The Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1935, 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1976), augmented this sparse
language modestly. Since national banks must have deposit insurance, a charter applicant must satisfy
the Act's standard for insurability. But this standard merely enumerates six factors to be considered by
the Comptroller: the financial history and condition of the bank, the adequacy of its capital structure,
its future earnings prospects, the general character of its management, the convenience and needs of
the community to be served by the bank, and whether its corporate powers are consistent with the
purpose of the act.
95. 12 C.F.R. § 4.2(b) (1974).
96. Scott, In Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions of the Federal Banking Agencies, 42 U.
CH. L. REv. 235, 261-68 (1975).
97. Id. at 268.
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tives in approving or denying applications for charters . . and . . . de-
fine in concrete terms the standards to be applied."98
On June 4, 1976, the Comptroller responded by publishing in the Fed-
eral Register a document entitled "Policy Statements on Corporate Activi-
ties." The statement articulated an overarching policy goal for bank
chartering-"to maintain a sound national banking system without plac-
ing undue restraint upon entry into that system." The statement imposed
several constraints on the pursuit of this goal: avoiding the chartering of
"so many banks that none can grow to a size sufficient to offer a full
range of needed services," admitting "only those qualified applicants that
can be economically supported and profitably operated," and protecting
the "viability" of newly chartered independent banks.
The policy statement went on to enumerate four "banking factors"
("income and expenses," "management," "stock distribution," and "capi-
tal"), five "market factors" ("economic condition and growth potential,"
"primary service area," "location," "population," and "financial institu-
tions"), and several "other factors" to be considered in evaluating an ap-
plication. Although the guidelines included a few objective tests for stock
distribution and adequacy of capital, 100 most of the relevant factors were
expressed in highly conclisory terms with no indication of their relative
weights.101
Predictably, the 1976 policy statement did not still the Comptroller's
critics. The Senate Banking Committee concluded in 1980 that: "OCC's
reliance on vague chartering standards ...[has] exposed the chartering
process to charges of favoritism and arbitrary decision making. '10 2 To
support its characterization, the study cited the high rate of disagreement
among internal OCC reviewers and alleged inconsistencies in handling
specific cases.1 03 Finding OCC's economic projections to have been wide
of the mark in several instances, the committee concluded that the "com-
munity need" criterion "is a poor indicator of a new bank's likely pros-
pects"' ' and proposed greater reliance on factors relating to organization
and management.
Almost simultaneously with release of the Committee report, the
Comptroller issued a revised policy statement. The statement spoke of
"clarifying" previous policy and "facilitat[ing] applicant and public un-
98. ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 75-1(1), 1 C.F.R. § 305.75-1(1) (1977).
99. 41 Fed. Reg. 47,964 (1976).
100. Two examples are a limit of 10% stock ownership by any one person and minimum capital
of $I,000,000. Id. at 47,965.
101. For example, the applicant's officers must have "reputations evidencing honesty and integ-
rity. They should have employment and business histories demonstrating success, and should be re-
sponsible in financial affsirs." Id. at 47,964-65.
102. MAJORIrY STAFF STUDY, supra note 3, at iv.
103. Id. at 18-19, 33.
104. Id. at 55.
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derstanding,"' 5 but its principal function was to announce a shift toward
a more competitive bank entry policy. 06 As an exercise in policy "clarifi-
cation," the 1980 statement accomplishes little. While the sheer volume of
words has increased since 1976, the few earlier per se rules relating to
stock ownership and capitalization have been replaced with vague rule-of-
reason language (e.g., "sufficient" capital,'1 7 "wide distribution of
stock""0 '). Aside from lowering the "community need" barrier to entry,t1
the policy statement provides little guidance to individual applicants.
The Comptroller's persistent reliance on an opaque Model II approach
should neither surprise nor dismay us. First, the likelihood that per se
rules will produce costly incongruities seems high, if one assumes-as
Comptrollers emphatically have-that the overriding purpose of entry re-
strictions is to maintain public confidence in the banking system by reduc-
ing the risk of failure. The likelihood that new entry will cause economic
dislocation and erosion of confidence-either through the entrant's failure
or by weakening an incumbent-seems to depend on a host of variables
relating to the entrant's capabilities, its competitors' positions, and market
conditions. These factors will vary widely from market to market, and the
history of chartering suggests that they can change markedly with shifts in
economic conditions.110
Encouraging compliance, moreover, seems largely irrevelant here.
Chartering standards are not aimed at modifying behavior. Their sole
function is to guide the selection of applicants who are qualified to be
admitted to the banking industry. It is true, of course, that the relative
transparency of standards may influence the rate of applications and, con-
sequently, the rate of entry. More precise criteria would reduce uncer-
tainty and might encourage applications from those dissuaded by the high
costs of compiling the necessary economic data. During a time of per-
105. 45 Fed. Reg. 68,603 (1980).
106. Statistics on the Comptroller's charter approval rate show that this policy shift had occurred
well before the 1980 policy statement. The approval rate, which had fallen below 50% in 1977,
increased to 88% in 1980. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 1980 ANNUAL
REPORT 240 (1980); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 1977 ANNUAL REPORT 7
(1977).
107. 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(c)(3)(iii) (1982).
108. Id. § 5.20(c)(3)(iv)(B).
109. For an empirical demonstration that the "need" criterion "significantly reduced the entry
rate into banking," see Peltzman, Entry into Commercial Banking, 8 J. L. & ECON. 11, 48 (1965).
110. Edwards & Edwards, Measuring the Effectiveness of Regulation: The Case of Bank Entry
Regulation, 17 J. L. & ECON. 445, 452 (1974). OCC's charter approval rate has fluctuated from
lows of 18% in 1965 and 1967, to a high of 66% in 1973, then down to a low of 45% in 1977, and
again dramatically upward since then. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 1973
ANNUAL REPORT 5, 7 (1973); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 1967 ANNUAL
REPORT 8 (1967); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 1965 ANNUAL REPORT 22
(1965); supra note 106.
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ceived inadequacy of banking services, this factor might exert a stronger
pull toward greater transparency.
The evidence does not support this thesis, however. The 1976 policy
statement-the high-water mark of OCC charter rule precision-is far
more protectionist in tone than the 1980 rules, and was issued by a
Comptroller whose charter approval rates were the lowest in the decade.
Furthermore, Comptrollers who wish to encourage new entry can often
encourage applications far more efficiently by making procompetitive pub-
lic statements than by issuing rule changes.""'
Transaction costs similarly offer little support for a high degree of pre-
cision. The costs of applying the rules are not substantial. The Comptrol-
ler received, on average, only about 120 formal charter applications per
year during the 1970's. The process for deciding cases is highly informal,
usually consisting of only a field examination and several internal reviews.
While organizers often have a sufficient stake in the outcome to demand
far more elaborate procedures, the courts and Congress have resisted pres-
sures to impose them.'1 2 The opportunity for applicants to reapply or to
seek entry through the state regulatory system undoubtedly mitigates those
pressures. Furthermore, the decisionmaking is highly centralized. Even af-
ter receiving blanket legislative authority in 1980 to delegate any power
vested in his office by law,"' the Comptroller has maintained tight central
control over chartering decisions. 14 This longstanding tradition of central-
ized decisionmaking has substantially reduced the pressure to use clear
rules to control agency decisionmakers.
The cost of rulemaking similarly cuts against increased transparency. If
it is true that the risks of incongruity are serious, the cost of developing a
transparent, yet congruent, rule would be quite high. Preliminary efforts
by staff economists to produce more rigorous models for predicting eco-
nomic impact have been discouraging.115 Nor does the Comptroller face as
great a tradeoff between ex ante and ex post policymaking costs as other
agencies, given the informality of the charter decisionmaking process and
the minimal explanation for rejections demanded by reviewing courts.
In sum, the degree of precision with which Comptrollers have articu-
lated charter policy, especially since 1976, seems fully consistent with the
context in which they operate. This is not to say that the substantive pol-
icy assumptions or the procedural informality associated with the regula-
111. For an asserted illustration, see MAJORITY STAFF STUDy, supra note 3, at 7-8 (Comptroller
James Saxon at the beginning of his tenure in 1962-1963).
112. See Scott, supra note 96.
113. 12 U.S.C. § 4a (Supp. V 1981).
114. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.3 (1981).
115. Interview with John Schockey, former OCC General Counsel (Jan. 10, 1981) (notes on file
with author).
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tion of bank entry are necessarily defensible.116 But in a system built on
these features, a substantial increase in charter rule precision would prob-
ably not produce benefits justifying its cost.
C. The Disability Insurance "Grid" Rule
The Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Program pays benefits to
wage earners and their dependents enrolled in the Social Security pro-
grams who lose their jobs as the result of a "disability." Since the pro-
gram's inception in 1957, the definition of a "disability" has undergone
repeated administrative revision and elaboration.1 17  This evolution
culminated in 1978 with adoption of the so-called "grid" rule-a complex
formula that specifies how various physical and vocational attributes of
claimants are to be integrated into the ultimate disability determination., 8
As a prototypical Model III rule, the grid rule has drawn intense criticism
for its alleged incongruity and inaccessibility."i 9
The Social Security Act of 1956 defined "disability" quite simply as
"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be ex-
pected to result in death or to be of long-continued and indefinite dura-
tion."11 20 Although the statutory formula has been revised several times,1 21
it still delegates primary responsibility to the Social Security Administra-
tion (SSA) to elaborate the meaning of "disability." Before 1978, SSA
devoted most of its attention to "physical and mental impairment," devel-
oping detailed guidelines for measuring impairments and defining several
"per se disabling" conditions.' 2 The nonmedical criteria for determining
"inability to engage in substantial gainful activity," however, remained
116. See, e.g., Alhadeff, A Reconsideration of Restrictions on Bank Entry, 76 Q.J. EcoN. 246
(1962); Tussing, The Case of Bank Failure, 10 J. L. & ECON. 129 (1967). The policies behind these
regulations show no signs of yielding.
117. For a more detailed account, see J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL
SFCURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 103-23 (1983).
118. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,366 (1978) (codified at 20 C.F.R. subpt. P app. 2 (1983)).
119. Litigation concerning the validity and application of the grid rules has been prolific. Most
circuits have upheld the rules. See Rivers v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1982); McCoy v.
Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir. 1982); Torres v. Secretary of Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
677 F.2d 167 (1st Cir. 1982); Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1982); Cummins v.
Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1982); Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1981). The Su-
preme Court reversed the two circuits that had partially invalidated the rules. Heckler v. Campbell,
103 S. Ct. 1952 (1983) (reversing Campbell v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 665 F.2d 48 (2d
Cir. 1981)); Heckler v. Broz, 51 U.S.L.W. 3857 (U.S. May 31, 1983) (vacating Broz v. Schweiker,
677 F.2d 1351 (11th Cir. 1982)).
120. Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 836, § 103(a), 70 Stat. 807, 815 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
423(d) (1976)).
121. Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, § 401(a), 74 Stat. 924, 964; Act of July 30, 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 303(a)(2), 79 Stat. 286, 367; Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 158(b),
81 Stat. 821, 868.
122. 22 Fed. Reg. 4362 (1957); 26 Fed. Reg. 5572 (1961); 33 Fed. Reg. 11,749 (1968).
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clouded in imprecise verbiage.12 Congress amended the Act in 1968 to
require SSA to consider the applicant's "age, education, and work experi-
ence" in making the disability determination.124 Until 1978, however, the
assessment of these factors was consigned to the judgment of claims
processing officials, who relied heavily on the professional opinion of voca-
tional experts.
125
The grid rule substituted a mechanical formula for the previously indi-
vidualized process in a large number of disability cases.1 26 The grid speci-
fies the relationships among four independent variables (the claimant's
"exertional capabilities," "education," "age," and "previous work experi-
ence") and the dependent variable ("disability").127 Each of the indepen-
dent variables can take several possible values-for example, there are
four "age" categories ("advanced," "closely approaching advanced,"
"younger (45-49)," and "younger (18-44)"), and three "experience"
groupings ("unskilled or none," "skilled or semiskilled-skills not trans-
ferable," and "skilled or semiskilled-skills transferable"). For each com-
bination of these variables, the rule specifies the ultimate decision ("dis-
abled"/"not disabled").
The grid rule is the latest stage in a relentless progression toward
transparency and complexity in the disability standard. The factor most
obviously responsible for this trend is transaction costs.12s The volume of
determinations is immense and was, until recently, growing at a rapid
rate. The number of hearings is still growing. 129 Moreover, although the
average cost of processing all DI claims is modest ($171 in 1978130), the
cost per contested claim is a good deal higher.1 "' The total administrative
123. Only the earnings test is reasonably transparent. See 26 Fed. Reg. 11,049, 11,051 (1961)
(codified as amended at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574-.1575 (1982)).
124. Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 158(b), 81 Stat. 821, 869 (inserted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(2)(A) (1976)).
125. For a description of the handling of claims, see R. DIXON, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
AND MASS JUSTICE 24-30 (1973).
126. The rule applies only to disability claims grounded on "exertional" incapacity. After elimi-
nating claims based on per se disabling conditions (e.g., blindness, loss of limbs), most claims fall
within this category.
127. 20 C.F.R. subpt. P app. 2 (1983).
128. Since the rules are intended solely to characterize a status resulting from an unexpected and
presumably unwanted cause, their evolution cannot plausibly be related to any compliance-related
goals. Their only possible behavioral objective would be to discourage malingerers from filing claims,
an effect that would be reflected in a reduction of transaction costs.
129. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., STAFF DATA AND MATER-
IALS RELATED TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 20-29, 69-72, 145-46
(Comm. Print 1982). From 1974 to 1981, DI applications dropped slightly from 1.33 million to 1.23
million, id. at 21-22, while hearing requests increased from 121,504 to 281,700, id. at 69-70.
130. SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., 1978 SSA YEAR IN REVIEW: ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY
PROGRAM 12 (1978).
131. One study estimated the cost per hearing at $500 to S1000. J. MASHAW, C. GoETZ, F.
GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND Ap-
PEALS 15 (1978).
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cost of the disability insurance system in 1978 was $327 million.1 32
Raw numbers like these fail to do full justice to the importance of
transaction costs. A "hidden" transaction cost in any benefits system is the
impact of delay on deserving applicants. The 551,500 applicants who re-
ceived a favorable decision in 1976, for example, had to wait an average
of 105 days for the award.13s The human costs of anxiety and deprivation
from such delays are enormous.
A second hidden transaction cost is the difficulty of controlling
subordinate decisionmakers. A substantial degree of de facto decentraliza-
tion is unavoidable in so enormous an operation. But the structure of the
DI program promotes decentralization with a vengeance. Initial decisions
(which become final determinations in the eighty-five percent of cases not
appealed to SSA) are made by officers of fifty autonomous state agencies
who are subject only to indirect supervision by SSA.3 These state agen-
cies themselves are often administratively decentralized and rely heavily
on consulting physicians and vocational experts.13 5 Within SSA, decisions
are made by a cadre of about seven hundred fiercely independent Admin-
istrative Law Judges (ALJ's) who preside at hearings where there are
usually no representatives of SSA present.38 Any decisionmaking appara-
tus so fragmented-especially one which affects such large sums of money
and so many people-cries out for tight, centralized control. Recent stud-
ies documenting inconsistencies among state agencies and ALJ's have in-
tensified pressures for reform.'3
Demands for tighter supervision naturally focus attention on the clarity
of substantive standards. The utility of conventional management control
devices like reporting systems, performance appraisal, and quality re-
view ' 38 ultimately depends on the transparency of the underlying stan-
dards to be applied.'3 9 It is one thing to document inconsistency in results
by comparing two individuals' resolutions of a hypothetical case.' 40 But it
132. H.R. REP. No. 100, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1979).
133. SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., 1977 SSA ANNUAL REPORT 20 (105-day mean processing time for
allowed claims as of October 1976); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 129, at 21
(number of claims awarded).
134. SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., supra note 133, at 52.
135. See R. DIXON, supra note 125, at 35-40.
136. See Bloch, Representation and Advocacy at Non-Adversary Hearings: The Need for Non-
Adversay ' Representatives at Social Security Disability Hearings, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 349, 356-66
(1981).
137. See J. MASHAW, C. Gomrz, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW,
supra note 131, at 3-4; Champagne & Danube, An Empirical Analysis of Decisions of Administrative
Law Judges in the Social Security Disability Program, 64 GEo. L.J. 43 (1975).
138. SSA's quality-control system is described in J. MAHAW, supra note 117, at 145-68 and
Chassman & Rolston, Social Security Disability Hearings: A Case Study in Quality Assurance and
Due Process, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 801 (1980).
139. See R. DIXON, supra note 125, at 51.
140. This technique was used in Secretary of Health & Human Sens., Implementation of Section
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is very difficult to remedy that inconsistency without having clear criteria.
Without the dramatic increase in regulatory objectivity, SSA's massive
quality control program and its impressive quantitative 141 gains would be
almost unthinkable.
Transparency is usually bought at the price of incongruity or ex ante
rulemaking costs. To take the latter first, the development of SSA's elabo-
rate scheme has undoubtedly been costly. But failure to develop generic
criteria would merely postpone, not avoid, rulemaking costs in a program
that has always required elaborate justification for individual decisions.
Disappointed recipients are entitled to increasingly thorough and coherent
explanations at successive levels. Formal hearing procedures (at the ALJ
stage)142 and searching judicial review143 together impose a particularly
rigorous justificatory burden on those who deny claims at the appellate
stage. A legalistic system for processing claims will reward heavy initial
investment in a priori rulemaking by reducing the cost of meeting its sub-
sequent explanatory obligation.
The incongruity argument is more troublesome. The current rules un-
doubtedly miss their target with some frequency.14 4 Can it be true, for
example, that no person in his late 40's who is unskilled, uneducated, and
limited to sedentary work, can be "disabled" ?145 Yet, despite such troub-
ling examples, the true cost of misclassifying a case depends on how close
the case is to the boundary between "disabled" and "not disabled." 4" A
regime that misclassifies 100,000 healthy malingerers or immobile
quadriplegics is far more costly to society than one that misclassifies
100,000 potentially handicapped persons. The latter, if granted benefits,
304(g) of Public Law 96-265, "Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980" (January 1982)
("The Bellmon Report"), reprinted in STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 129, at
133.
141. For example, processing time has dropped steadily in recent years. The mean time for initial
awards dropped from 110 days in 1976 to 85 days in 1978. SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., supra note 130, at
12. Mean processing time for ALJ hearings fell from 249 days in 1976 to 145 days in 1979. SOCIAL
SEC. ADMIN., 1979 SSA ANNUAL REPORT 59 (1979). The "productivity index," SSA's overall mea-
sure of productivity in processing DI cases, increased from 100 in 1967 to 145 in 1976. SOCIAL SEC.
ADMIN., supra note 130, at v.
142. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339, 349 (1976) (post-termination evidentiary hear-
ing adequate safeguard of claimants' rights).
143. See Echevarria v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 685 F.2d 751, 756 (2d Cir. 1983)
(reversing SSA's denial of benefits because ALJ did not fulfill his "special duty to pro se claimants").
144. See Goldhammer, The Effect of the New Vocational Regulations on Social Security and Sup-
plemental Security Income Disability Claims, 32 AD. L. REv. 501, 502-03 (1980) (discussing omis-
sions from SSA's list of impairments).
145. 20 C.F.R. subpt. P app. 2, § 201.17 (1983); see Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351 (11 th Cir.
1982) (criticizing mechanistic use of grid regulations but approving their use as burden-shifting tool),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Heckler v. Broz, 51 U.S.L.W. 3857 (U.S. May 31, 1983).
146. See Mashaw, How Much of What Quality?: A Comment on Conscientious Procedural De-
sign, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 823, 824-28 (1980) (discussing relationship between closeness of case and
its cost).
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may forgo only limited productive effort, and, if denied benefits, may have
some hope for independent support. The relevant question then becomes
whether the unavoidable incongruities of a bright-line rule cluster near
the dividing line or near the extremes. As Professor Jerry Mashaw shows,
under SSA's current regime, the incongruities cluster near the dividing
line.147 SSA's decision rule uses simple, transparent tests to eliminate the
easy cases at both extremes, reserving the closer cases for resolution under
more refined criteria. 48 Intuitively, at least, the grid seems to embrace
within the company of the disabled the most deserving cases.
Moreover, while the rule contains many more bright lines than before,
it still contains strategically located discretionary judgments, such as the
threshold severity-of-impairment determination, 49 the "medical equiva-
lence" test for unusual medical impairments, 50 and the classification of a
claimants' "residual functional capacity."' 5' The flexibility afforded by
these assessments enables decisionmakers to avoid egregiously unjust ap-
plications of the rule. On this impressionistic level, the SSA rules seem to
hold incongruity costs within tolerable limits.
This brings us back to transaction costs, since the rules achieve their
objective only at the cost of enormous complexity. Does not the sheer diffi-
culty of the decision rule compensate, in added fact-finding and interpre-
tive efforts, for the savings effected by increased transparency? The an-
swer here seems to be, "No." First, because the rule does not announce a
standard of behavior,' 52 its complexity has no adverse effect on private
planning. Second, most of the effort currently expended on gathering med-
ical and vocational information in processing a claim would still be re-
quired under a superficially simpler standard. And since most cases raise
only a few contestable issues, the overall complexity of the rules is less
important than their accessibility and transparency. In these latter re-
spects, SSA's rules receive a high score.
D. INS Change-of-Status Policy
Until 1952, aliens visiting the United States on non-immigrant visas
who wished to remain had to return to their native lands to obtain an
immigrant visa from the United States Consul."5" To relieve the burden of
147. See Mashaw, Administrative Due Process as Social-Cost Accounting, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1423, 1441 (1981).
148. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1983).
149. Id. § 404.1520(c).
150. Id. § 404.1520(d).
151. Id. § 404.1545-.1546.
152. See supra note 128.
153. These aliens had to return to their country even if they were immediately eligible for such a
visa. See Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Adjudication: A Case Study of the Informal Agency Process, 1
J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 350-51 (1972).
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that requirement, Congress authorized the Attorney General, "in his dis-
cretion" and "under such regulations as he may prescribe," to adjust the
status of some aliens to that of "an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence."' '
To qualify for adjustment of status, the applicant must meet several
statutory criteria, including immediate eligibility for an immigrant visa
under applicable quotas.1 55 These threshold criteria are either facially
transparent or well articulated by a history of interpretation. The addi-
tional "discretionary" element of the determination, however, is neither
transparent nor well articulated. In delegating his authority to the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Attorney General made no
effort to clarify the statute's "discretionary" residue."" The INS has
taken only very modest steps in that direction. Its published regulations
under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act157 provide no
extra-statutory criteria for exercising discretion. " The Service's Opera-
tions Instructions merely state a "policy that the application should not be
denied as a matter of discretion when substantial equities exist."15'  The
published decisions of the INS District Directors and the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals (BIA) yield only a list of undefined and unweighted "ad-
verse factors" (e.g., preconceived intent to seek permanent residence at the
time of entry, misrepresentations made in the application, petty criminal
conduct, illegal employment) and "equities" (e.g., bona fide marriage,
substantial difficulties in resettling in or returning to one's native land,
candor in dealing with the Service).16
The Service has frequently been criticized for the opacity of these stan-
dards. Professor Abraham Sofaer, for example, presented compelling sta-
tistical and anecdotal evidence of inconsistencies in the Service's exercise of
discretionary authority."' Discretionary denials, he observed, were con-
siderably more susceptible to political intervention and administrative re-
154. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 245(a), 66 Stat. 163, 217 (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1976)).
155. 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(g) (1981).
156. See id. § 2.1.
157. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 245, 66 Stat. 162, 217 (current version
at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976)).
158. 8 C.F.R. § 245 (1981).
159. INS Operations Instructions § 245.5d(5), reprinted in 4 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 23-532 (1983). For assistance in determining whether "sub-
stantial equities" exist, the District Director is referred to another discretionary determination ("vol-
untary departure"), the published standards for which are equally opaque. See id. § 242.10, reprinted
in 4 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra, at 23-488.
160. See 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFiELD, supra note 159, § 7.7d, at 790-95; Orlow, Adjust-
inent of Status of Lawful Permanent Resident, in TENTti ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZA-
TION INSTITUTE 151, 156-68 (A. Fragomen, Jr. ed. 1979).
161. Sofaer, supra note 153, at 365-93.
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versal than denials based on the more explicit statutory criteria.' While
most courts have upheld section 245's discretionary power,l"S a few judges
have voiced concern about its breadth. Dissenting in Ameeriar v. INS, "
Judge Freedman characterized the Service's exercise of discretion as "an
utterly unguided and unpredictable undertaking. Only the inevitable ne-
cessity of disposing of the case is specified, like a result without a cause.
What is the desired goal and what guides should channel the course to it
receive no recognition.'
65
In 1979, the Service proposed a rule establishing standards for changing
the status of aliens. 6 The stated purpose of the rule was "to assure that
all applicants and petitioners receive fair and equal treatment before the
Service."'"7 The rule listed six adverse and five favorable factors, required
adjustment in the absence of adverse factors, and stated a strong presump-
tion against adjusting the status of any alien who had evaded the normal
immigration process.168
While one might be tempted to dismiss these proposed rules as a mere
codification of existing practice, they make more visible and mandatory
what had hitherto been largely implicit. Even this modest degree of policy
clarification was too much for the INS. In a terse order issued on January
21, 1981, the INS withdrew the proposed rule, stating:
[I]t is impossible to foresee and enumerate all the favorable or ad-
verse factors which may be relevant and should be considered in the
exercise of administrative discretion. Listing some factors, even with
the caveat that such list is not all inclusive, poses a danger that use
of guidelines may become so rigid as to amount to an abuse of
discretion.' 6
At least the Service is consistent: its explanations are no more transpar-
ent than its rules. In order to fathom the rejection of the proposed rule, we
must look behind the official explanation. Several INS district officials
feared increased litigation. One particularly colorful comment predicted:
162. Id. at 385-93.
163. See, e.g., Faddah v. INS, 580 F.2d 132, 133 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding that obtaining tempo-
rary visas by aliens intending to remain permanently is sufficient to support discretionary refusal to
adjust status of aliens under § 245); Ameeriar v. INS, 438 F.2d 1028, 1032 (3d Cir. 1971) (no abuse
of discretion where alien was denied permanent resident status for bypassing normal procedures and
entering country on visitor's visa with intent to remain).
164. 438 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1971).
165. Id. at 1042.
166. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,187, 36,191 (1979) (proposing 8 C.F.R. § 245.8). The rules also proposed
standards for the exercise of several other discretionary functions.
167. Id. at 36,187.
168. Id. at 36,191.
169. 46 Fed. Reg. 9119 (1981).
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[T]he proposals embodied in this draft would subject the Service to a
constant barrage of spurious appeal [sic] by Immigration attorneys
on the basis of the semantics proposed to be injected into the regula-
tions. They subvert Government to the vagaries of attorney dilatory
tactics and would appear to tie our hands completely in the cobwebs
of endless liturgical [sic] dialogue.
17 0
It is hard to take such an assertion seriously. If anything, transaction
costs cut in the opposite direction. The sheer volume of status-adjustment
cases is staggering."' Moreover, most individual applicants have a suffi-
cient interest in the outcome to expend considerable effort in the pro-
cess.17 2 The Sofaer study showed that the Service eventually reversed over
ninety percent of the initial denials appealed.173 Professor Sofaer thus re-
garded the savings in transaction costs from clearer rules as substantial.' 4
Greater clarity would, of course, entail additional ex ante rulemaking
costs. But that investment would undoubtedly be repaid by the reduced
explanatory burden on individual adjudicators. The INS Operations In-
structions require that a discretionary denial not governed by applicable
precedent be accompanied by a "full discussion of the favorable and unfa-
vorable factors" considered.'75 Clearer rules could facilitate the search for
applicable precedent and shrink the residual category of decisions requir-
ing elaborate ad hoc justification.
Another current form of ex post rulemaking by the Service is the selec-
tion of precedents for publication. The Service publishes only about a
hundred of the thousands of status-adjustment decisions made each year
by its district directors.' 76 The very act of selection constitutes a form of
rulemaking that could be displaced by issuing clearer ex ante guidelines.
Transparent rules could achieve additional savings in transaction costs
by facilitating internal quality control. Decisionmaking in status-
adjustment cases is unavoidably decentralized. In most cases, ' 7 initial de-
170. Memorandum from [name and position deleted], INS, to Lionel J. Castillo, Commissioner,
INS (Sept. 12, 1978), at 1.
171. In fiscal year 1977, INS received 90,450 applications and granted 54,523. 1977 INS AN-
NUAL REPORT 8 (1977). In fiscal year 1978, the number of status adjustments granted rose to
101,397. 1978 INS ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1978).
172. It is true that an alien whose application is denied for discretionary reasons can still apply
for an immigrant visa at the American Consulate in his native land. But this option may entail
considerable costs, including round trip transportation for the alien and his family, the delay, the risk
of erroneous denial by the Consul, and in some cases exposure to military service or imprisonment at
home.
173. Sofaer, supra note 153, at 396-97.
174. Id. at 421.
175. INS Operations Instructions §245.5d(2), reprinted in 4 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
supra note 159, at 23-531 to -532.
176. Interview with Paul Schmidt, Acting General Counsel, INS, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 17,
1980) (notes on file with author).
177. Nonimmigrant aliens may first apply for change of status at a deportation hearing. In that
event, the initial determination is made by a Special Inquiry Officer ("immigration judge"). See 2 C.
GORDON & H. RosENFiELD, supra note 159, §7.7e, at 7-98.
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cisions are rendered by "Immigration Examiners" assigned to the Ser-
vice's thirty-six district offices.178 To control the work product of this far-
flung corps of adjudicators, the INS relies primarily on two devices. The
weaker instrument is an exhortation in its Operations Instructions to deci-
sionmakers to review the selected precedents periodically published by the
agency. 179 The stronger control is the system of hierarchical review. A
superior district officer must review all discretionary denials and any dis-
cretionary approvals involving adverse factors.180 In fact, according to one
former General Counsel, district directors personally review and issue all
status adjustment decisions.181 In addition, unsuccessful applicants may
request review at the district level by a motion to reopen or to reconsider,
and may obtain a new evaluation of their application at a deportation
hearing. 8 ' More transparent decision rules would enable the Service to
reduce its reliance on this elaborate system of quality control.
Clearer rules may also encourage greater compliance with the immigra-
tion laws. Every year thousands of illegal aliens seek residence in the
United States. Ambiguous criteria for changing the status of non-
immigrant visitors may encourage would-be immigrants to evade proper
immigration channels. Clear standards cannot, of course, discourage eva-
sion if physical remoteness or cultural barriers block their communication
to aliens. But aliens affected by status-adjustment standards are already
sufficiently familiar with immigration procedures to obtain a non-immi-
grant visa, enter the United States, and apply for status adjustment. They
are therefore likely to be aware of INS policy.
Measuring the potential costs of the incongruity produced by a more
transparent standard is difficult. It is unclear what Congress intended by
inserting a discretionary element. The statutory eligibility conditions seem
to address the most obvious concerns (e.g., excluding "misfits" or prevent-
ing'an evasion of quotas). One can imagine three possible reasons for fur-
ther limiting access to status adjustment: (1) to prevent the circumvention
of normal immigration channels; (2) to assure harmony between status-
adjustment policy and our relations with foreign countries; and (3) to
178. Sofaer, supra note 153, at 357 n.25. Most examiners are non-lawyers. Sofaer, Judicial Con-
trol of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1293, 1299
(1972).
179. INS Operations Instructions § 245.5d(1), reprinted in 4 C. GORDON & H. ROSE.IELD,
supra note 159, at 23-531.
180. Id. § 245.5d(3), (4), reprinted in 4 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 159, at 23-
532.
181. Letter from Charles Gordon, INS General Counsel, to James Orlow, Esq. (Feb. 25, 1972)
at 1.
182. See Orlow, supra note 160, at 165-67. Denial by an immigration judge (at the deportation
stage) is appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals and a Court of Appeals. Id. at 167.
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limit status adjustment to persons likely to contribute to society. The first
of these purposes surely lends itself to a reasonably transparent rule. The
second justifies at most a separate rule (or exception from the standard
approach) for nationals of countries with whom our bilateral relations re-
quire a distinct policy.
The third hypothesized statutory objective provides the most plausible
justification for resisting rule clarification. Assessing a person's prospective
contribution to society, so the argument runs, is a holistic judgment that
cannot be reduced to a formula. In the words of one INS official: "[T]he
diversity of human activities tends to continually generate new factors and
issues which should logically affect the exercise of discretion."18 At times,
in fact, the Service seems to treat discretion as an advantage, rather than
an absence of law. 84 Perhaps the Service is following a notion akin to
Professor Tribe's "structural due process" model 85 or Professor
Mashaw's "moral judgment" model."8 " Central to these models is the in-
junction that the state must permit persons with whom it deals to partici-
pate in the articulation of the very standards to be applied to their case.
Reliance on a transparent antecedent rule effectively precludes that
participation.
But status adjustment fails to satisfy the prerequisites specified by
Mashaw and Tribe. The change-of-status case is rarely a contest of rela-
tive "deservedness" or a determination of "culpability." 87 Nor is it usu-
ally the focal point of a clash of fundamental values. 88 While outcomes
occasionally turn on the applicant's moral character, 8 9 most of the rea-
sons for discretionary grant or denial could be subjected to greater anterior
specification without offending an applicant's humanity.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE FAILURE AND SUBOPTIMAL RULE PRECISION
The "precision calculus" illustrated in Section III is a normative model,
not a behavioral model, of administrative rulemaking. Even if one accepts
my favorable assessment of the age-60, bank chartering, and disability
rules, one must still ask whether it is reasonable to expect policymakers
systematically to investigate the consequences of their linguistic choices.
Selecting the optimally precise form for a given rule would seem to re-
183. Memorandum from [name and position deleted], INS, to Lionel J. Castillo, Commissioner,
INS (Sept. 15, 1978) at 1.
184. See 46 Fed. Reg. 9119 (1981).
185. Tribe, Structural Due Process, supra note 33.
186. Mashaw, Conflict and Compromise Among Models of Administrative Justice, 1981 DUKE
L.J. 181, 188-90.
187. Id. at 188-89.
188. Tribe, Structural Due Process, supra note 33, at 310-14.
189. See Matter of Francois, 10 I. & N. Dec. 168 (1963).
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quire qualities beyond the reach of many administrators: a selfless concern
for the public good, consistent goals, comprehensive vision, and accurate
foresight. Real policymakers, by contrast, are ordinary mortals burdened
with incomplete knowledge, imperfect vision, and selfish desires. Govern-
mental rulemaking is plagued with "administrative failures" as numerous
and stubborn as the "market failures" it theoretically seeks to correct.290
These characteristics may prevent the attainment of perfect rationality,
but they need not foreclose a tolerable approximation, or "bounded ration-
ality."19 Herbert Simon long ago pointed out that "administrative man"
does not optimize, he "satisfices." ' 92 He proceeds incrementally, testing
marginal deviations from the status quo against a slowly shifting threshold
of acceptable performance. 9 To borrow a metaphor from the "cyber-
netic" theorists, decisionmakers adopt thermostat mechanisms to test poli-
cies against an uncertain and changing environment.'" These adaptive
responses to imperfect information do not prevent errors, but they do
promise that errors will be corrected. 9 Where these processes work effec-
tively, we would expect even poorly drafted administrative rules to evolve
toward the optimally precise formulation.
A. Communication of Social Costs and Benefits
This theory of error correction rests on two crucial assumptions: (1)
that the social costs of excessively incongruent, inaccessible, or opaque
rules will be effectively communicated to rulemakers; and (2) that
rulemakers will respond to those costs. The first assumption incorporates
the plausible premise that those with the most to lose (gain) from the
promulgation of a particular rule will invest the most in efforts to defeat
(enact) it."" Thus, in the pilot retirement example, if aging pilots stand to
lose more (in reduced income) from adoption of an "age-60" rule than
younger pilots stand to gain (from more rapid advancement), one would
190. See Wolf, A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: A Framework for Implementation Analysis, 22 J.
L. & ECON. 107, 107 (1979); see also 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 20-40 (1975)
(speaking of "organizational failures").
191. See March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity and the Engineering of Choice, 9 BELL J.
ECON. 587, 590-91 (1978).
192. H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 79 (3d ed. 1976); H. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN
198 (1957).
193. See Diver, Policyinaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 393,
399-400 (1981).
194. See W. ASHBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CYBERNETICS 24-41 (1956); J. STEINBRUNER, THE
CYBERNETIC THEORY OF DECISION 51 (1974).
195. See D. BRAYBROOXE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION 71-77 (1963); Lindblom,
The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PuB. AD. REv. 79 (1959).
196. This is the premise of various theories of democracy, including pluralism, see R. DAHL, A
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 134-35 (1956), and "economic theories," see, e.g., Posner, Theo-
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expect an organization representing the pilots to lobby against its
adoption.
19 7
One cannot, however, logically equate the intensity of the response to a
policy decision with the magnitude of the costs and benefits generated by
the decision. The cost of sending signals of equivalent intensity may not be
the same for each of the interests affected. The most vociferous lobby need
not have the highest stake in the outcome; it may simply have the lowest
organization costs. 10 8
The FAA's decision to adopt the age-60 rule, for example, was greeted
by intense criticism from the pilots' association and silence from the flying
public. Yet the FAA should not necessarily have relaxed the rule. The net
safety benefits to the public from retaining the rule might have greater
value than the pilots' lost income. Yet the cost of organizing the public to
lobby on behalf of the rule is much greater than the cost of organizing
pilots to lobby for its relaxation,199 and pilots can communicate their
views far more efficiently than airline passengers.
Of course, reality is not as clear-cut as my example. Other well-
organized factions, such as airlines and enforcement officials, may effi-
ciently champion interests neglected by the pilots or shared by the travel-
ing public. But the example does make the point that widely dispersed
costs or benefits are less effectively represented in policymaking than con-
centrated costs or benefits.2 00 Thus we would expect error-correction to
favor interests championed by enforcers and regulated firms and to under-
value interests of unorganized beneficiaries of government programs.
The effect of disparity in organization costs on the precision of particu-
lar rules is not immediately obvious. Large, unorganized groups have no
intrinsic preference for transparent rules. Beneficiaries of regulatory pro-
grams, for example, are as likely to object to the over- or under-
inclusiveness of bright-line rules as to the evasion and misapplication of
opaque rules. On occasion, however, the interests of regulated producers
will diverge sufficiently from those of consumers to affect the precision of
rules. Incumbent licensees, for instance, may have a powerful interest in
maintaining especially vague or complex licensing standards as a barrier
ries of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 335, 344-50 (1974); Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BEU J. ECON. 3, 10-13 (1971).
197. In fact, the Air Line Pilots Association abandoned its longstanding opposition to the age-60
rule in 1980, citing its success at adjusting pilots' salaries and pensions to the age 60 retirement date.
NIA REPORT, supra note 29, app. C, at C-39 to -40.
198. See M. OLsoN, THE LOGIC OF COLLEcTIVE AcrIoN 46-47 (1965).
199. Pilots are fewer in number than airline passengers, their individual stakes in the decision are
much greater, and they have already been organized for other purposes. In addition, pilots have access
to the policymaking process-the right to a hearing in individual decertification actions-denied to the
general public.
200. R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULA-TION 39-42 (1970); W. RIKFR, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL
COALITIONS (1962).
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to entry by competitors.20 1 The interest of consumers, by contrast, might
be better served by clearer, more accessible standards that reduce the
transaction costs of obtaining licenses. If the incumbents can organize and
lobby the rulemaker more cheaply than consumers or potential entrants,
the signals received by the rulemaker will be biased in favor of a Model II
formulation.
Television station licensing provides a classic illustration. The standards
employed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for broad-
cast licenses have long been regarded as a model of administrative opac-
ity.202 In thirty years of television licensing, these standards have stub-
bornly resisted significant clarification.'" It seems eminently plausible
that this resiliency reflects an imbalance between the power of incumbent
broadcasters and that of viewers and potential entrants. Because major
market television franchises have enormous value2 ' and because new en-
try into that market usually displaces an existing licensee, incumbents
wish to maintain high barriers to entry. Both the enormous cost of con-
tested renewal proceedings 0 5 and the infrequency of challenges to incum-
bents208 indicate that the incumbents have established such barriers by
preserving the Commission's opaque renewal standards. Moreover, the af-
filiation of many television licensees with one of the three major net-
works20 7 decreases their organizational costs far below those of viewers or
potential entrants. Consequently, neither the networks' opposition to more
transparent entry criteria, 08 nor the acquiescence of the networks' oppo-
nents should surprise us.
Recipients of public assistance programs, by contrast, may have a
201. On the use of regulation to create barriers to entry in general, see B. OwEN & R. BRAEU-
TIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME 2-9 (1978).
202. See, e.g., Anthony, Towards Simplicity and Rationality in Comparative Broadcast Licensing
Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1, 39 (1971); Geller, The Comparathe Renewal Process in Television:
Problems and Suggested Solutions, 61 VA. L. REv. 471, 500-03 (1975); Schwartz, Comparative Tele-
vision and the Chancellor's Foot, 47 GEo. L.J. 655, 678-89 (1959).
203. The FCC has launched several abortive efforts to clarify its policies. See, e.g., Policy State-
ment Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424
(1970), struck down in Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Notice of Inquiry, In the Matter of Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Appli-
cant, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 27 F.C.C.2d 580 (1971), terminated without
action, Report and Order, 66 F.C.C.2d 419 (1977), aff'd sub nom. National Black Media Coalition
v. FCC, 589 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
204. See Cass, RKO: A Special Kind of Lottery, 9 MEDIA L. NOTES 2, 3 (No. 4, 1982).
205. See Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1205 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(citing 1969 figure of $250,000 to prepare an application for major-market television license).
206. From 1961 through 1978, there were 17 comparative television hearings. Central Florida
Enters. Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
207. R. CAss, REVOLUTION IN THE WASTELAND 8-12 (1981).
208. See In the Matter of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Stemming from
the Comparative Hearing Process, FCC Broadcast Docket No. 81-742, in response to Notice of In-
quiry, 88 F.C.C.2d 21 (1981) (Comments of CBS, NBC, and ABC).
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stronger voice in policymaking than beneficiaries of regulatory programs.
The process of individualized application, eligibility review, and termina-
tion theoretically gives recipients more direct access to policymakers than
regulatory beneficiaries possess. If the stakes in individual cases frequently
justify the expense of litigation and appeal,2 0' recipients' interests slighted
at the rulemaking stage will be asserted in the adjudication of claims. Re-
peated efforts by individual claimants to circumvent bright-line rules will
alert policymakers to their incongruity costs, just as repeated efforts to
exploit ambiguities in open-textured standards will dramatize the transac-
tion and misapplication costs.
One cannot, however, always count on beneficiary self-help to cleanse
impurities in the formulation of public assistance eligibility standards.
Beneficiaries, as individuals, may lack the necessary knowledge, access, or
incentive. Disappointed applicants for scarce public housing units, for ex-
ample, may be too demoralized to demand clarification of vague selection
standards.21 0 Native Americans 11 or aliens212 may be handicapped by
cultural or linguistic barriers from effectively counteracting either the pa-
tronizing opacity or insensitive rigidity of their would-be bureaucratic
benefactors.
B. Divergence of Public and Private Interests
The receipt of accurate signals about social costs and benefits is a neces-
sary, but not sufficient, condition for optimal precision of rules. As men-
tioned earlier, a second condition is that the rulemaker be responsive to
those signals. He must act to maximize social benefit or minimize social
cost.
In today's intellectual climate that assumption may seem quaintly he-
roic. Most contemporary students of administrative behavior reject an ear-
lier generation's faith in the public-spiritedness of governmental officials
as hopelessly naive.21" The revisionists claim that administrators pursue
strictly personal objectives like wealth, power, and fame. 14 Rather than
209. Jerry Mashaw estimates the average DI claim to be worth $30,000 to the claimant. J.
MASHAW, supra note 117, at 81. The number of hearings demanded exceeded 300,000 in 1982.
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 129, at 70.
210. See, e.g., Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
211. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
212. See Asimakopoulos v. INS, 445 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1971).
213. See Posner, supra note 196, at 336-41. Some recent accounts of airline deregulation rely on
"public interest" explanations for administrative actions in support of deregulation. See S. BREYER,
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 317 (1982); Levine, Revisionism Revised? Airline Deregulation and
the Public Interest, 44 LAW & CoNrFFnMP. PROBs. 179, 182 (Winter 1981).
214. W. NISKANEN, BuREAucRAcY AND REPRESENTATIvE GOvERNMENT 36-42 (1971); Nis-
kanen, The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy, 58 AM. EcoN. Rv. PAPERS & Pocs. 293, 296-98
(1968). For a critique of Niskanen's assumptions, see Breton & Wintrobe, The Equilibrium Size of a
Budget-Maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen's Theory of Bureaucracy, 83 J. PoiL EcoN. 195
(1975).
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seeking to tnaximize social benefit, administrators will seek to maximize
"budgets," '15 "votes," '2 16 or "power."2"" Of course, they may also enjoy
promoting "the public good." '218 But actions motivated by a mix of selfish
desires and idiosyncratic notions of social welfare will only incidentally
correspond with the social optimum.
This view invites us to think of administrative policymakers as profit-
maximizing entrepreneurs who manufacture standards. As such, the
agency will select that mix of transparency, congruity, and complexity"'
that maximizes its net income. Like other profit-maximizing producers, it
will consider only internal costs and benefits.
Using this analysis to predict the precision in particular standards re-
quires us to separate the various costs and benefits enumerated earlier
22 0
into "internal" and "external" categories. The proper assignment of costs
and benefits depends, of course, on the rulemaker's utility function. What
is "external" to one rulemaker may be "internal" to another. A regulator
seeking to maximize "votes," ' for instance, will probably respond to a
broader segment of the public than a regulator seeking only to maximize
his own future income.22 Let us initially adopt the most restrictive as-
sumption-that "internal" effects are only those that have a direct impact
on the rulemaker's budget. In the next section we will examine the impli-
cations of relaxing that assumption.2
A policymaker concerned only with the direct fiscal impact of his ac-
tions would choose a rule that minimizes the sum of his rulemaking and
enforcement costs. He would ignore its adverse consequences for private
transaction costs, noncompliance, or incongruent behavior. Rules promul-
gated under these conditions would frequently deviate from the optimal
amount of precision.
To illustrate this point, let us return to our earlier distinction between
external and internal rules. 2 The "externalities" hypothesis predicts that
215. Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & EcON. 211 (1976).
216. See Wilson, The Dead Hand of Regulation, 25 PUB. INTERESr 39 (Fall 1971); Wilson, The
Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 41 PUB. INTEREST 77 (Fall 1975).
217. See Hilton, The Basic Behavior of Regulatory Commissions, 62 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS &
PROc. 47 (1972); Manne, Individual Constraints and Incentives in Governnent Regulation of Busi-
ness, in INTERACTION OF ECONOMICS AND LAW 23 (B. Siegan ed. 1977).
218. See Eckert, On the Incentives of Regulators: The Case of Taxicabs, 14 PUB. CHOICE 83,
85-88 (Spring 1973).
219. Cf Magat & Estomin, The Behaior of Regulatory Agencies, in ATrACKING REGULATORY
PROBLEMS, supra note 43, at 101 ("quality" of regulations includes "clarity of interpretation" and
"ease of enforcement").
220. See supra pp. 73-74.
221. See Peltzman, supra note 215, at 211-14.
222. See Eckert, The Life Cycle of Regulatory Connissioners, 24 J.L & ECoN. 113 (1980).
223. See infra pp. 105-06.
224. See supra pp. 76-77.
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external rules will generally deviate farther from the social optimum than
internal rules. An agency internalizes most of the costs and benefits associ-
ated with the precision of internal standards. An incongruent rule for as-
signing staff, for example, misallocates agency resources. Similarly, the
unnecessary transaction costs from insufficiently transparent internal rules
are borne by the agency. If an excessively vague prosecutorial guideline
repeatedly forces agency prosecutors to seek interpretations from supervi-
sors, the agency pays in lower staff productivity. Conversely, if clear staff
instructions enable the agency to discipline uncooperative staff without
protracted grievance hearings, the agency benefits.
A larger share of the burden inflicted by suboptimally precise external
rules, by contrast, falls on persons outside the agency. Over-inclusive oc-
cupational safety standards, for example, burden employers, while under-
inclusive standards permit excessive injury to workers. An agency less re-
sponsive to these external costs than to its internal costs of applying rules
may favor rigid, bright-line formulations over more flexible alternatives.
This may help to explain the frequently observed tendency of health,
safety, and environmental regulators to adopt highly specific, inflexible
standards. 5
Similarly, the confusion and evasion generated by regulatory vagueness
may burden the regulated or benefitted public far more than the regula-
tor. Our broadcast licensing example of the previous section provides an
illustration. " " As I suggested there, vague licensing standards discourage
challenges to incumbents by driving up the cost and increasing the uncer-
tainty of comparative licensing proceedings. Yet the burden of this adverse
consequence falls primarily on the viewing public and potential entrants.
Those consequences of the strategy that the rulemaker bears are lower
rulemaking costs and fewer hearings. From the perspective of the
rulemaker's narrowly defined fiscal self-interest, the tradeoff is decidedly
favorable.
To some rulemakers, rule enforcement costs are external. The purest
example is a legislative body, but most administrative agencies rely to
some extent on the courts, other agencies, and the public to enforce their
rules. The more extreme the separation, the more appealing Model II
formulations are likely to appear. The rulemaker captures the benefit of
Model II rules (low initial rulemaking investment) while exporting their
costs (high enforcement costs) to someone else. This analysis helps to ex-
plain why legislatures customarily use open-ended language to embody
their substantive commands. 27
225. See E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 4.
226: See supra pp. 100-01.
227. See Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U.
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The costs and benefits associated with competing formulations also have
a temporal dimension. Some options, like Model III, involve a heavy ini-
tial rulemaking effort while others, such as Model II, necessitate substan-
tial future rulemaking. Rational decisionmakers frequently encounter
problems of intertemporal comparisons, of course, and routinely cope with
them by discounting. By applying a suitable discount rate, the analyst
converts streams of costs and benefits into present values and simply
selects that option having the greatest present value.228 The same method
should be used to select the optimally precise formulation of a standard.
The self-interested policymaker, however, may have an internal dis-
count rate different from the optimal social discount rate. Whereas the
social discount rate should reflect the opportunity cost of capital generally
prevailing in the society, 29 an administrator's individual discount rate re-
flects the opportunity cost of personal capital (time and effort) invested in
the enterprise. 30 Most political appointees, for example, have a short ten-
ure in office and are therefore likely to assign a high opportunity cost to
the investment of their time.' Thus their discount rate will greatly ex-
ceed the social discount rate.
Socially suboptimal time horizons are a universal problem in a political
system such as ours, and thus one might expect all administrative policy to
be suboptimally precise. But in many agencies, the nearsightedness of po-
litical appointees is powerfully counterbalanced by strongly entrenched ca-
reer bureaucrats. 23' In general, older agencies will exhibit this characteris-
tic while newer agencies are more likely to be dominated by short-
termers."'3 The head of a new agency may want to show immediate re-
sults. This desire creates a strong pressure for regulatory formulae that
can be enacted quickly and enforced mechanically, although a more flexi-
ble approach might achieve a better balance of social values. Shortly after
its creation, for example, the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion uncritically adopted thousands of detailed standards, originally devel-
oped as voluntary guidelines by private industry groups, as mandatory
occupational safety standards. Only much later did OSHA begin to wres-
tle with the glaring incongruities produced by this strategy. "
CHI. L. REv. 263, 288-90 (1982); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1695-96 (1975).
228. See E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 159-76 (1978).
229. See Baumol, On the Social Rate of Discount, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 788 (1968); Marglin, The
Social Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment, 77 Q.J. EcoN. 95 (1963).
230. See W. NISKANEN, supra note 214, at 114-23 (bureaucrat's personal discount rate a func-
tion of expected tenure in office).
231. See Eckert, supra note 222; Hilton, supra note 217.
232. See M. DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY (1979).
233. M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 74-95 (1955).
234. See Zeckhauser & Nichols, The Occupational Safety and Health Administration-An Over-
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C. Internalization of Social Costs and Benefits
The classification of costs and benefits on which the previous argument
rests is, of course, grossly oversimplified. Not even the most self-serving
bureaucrats ignore the costs they inflict or the burdens they impose on
persons outside their agencies. Virtually every objective commonly as-
sumed to motivate administrators-future income, reputation, power
-depends on a larger political process.2"5 That political process, operat-
ing through the mechanisms of authorization, appropriation, appointment,
and oversight, transforms private benefits and costs into administrative re-
sources or burdens.'3 Airline pilots, for example, have repeatedly peti-
tioned Congress to pressure the FAA to change its retirement rule.
237
While successful to date, the FAA's defense against these attacks cannot
have been costless to the agency.
If the political process faithfully converted social costs and benefits into
administrative costs and benefits, we would not be concerned about exter-
nalities. While pursuing private gain, administrators would accomplish
social good. But, of course, the process does not always work that way.
Various features of our electoral process-such as the equal weighting of
votes, ' the two-party system,2 9 and the districting of most legisla-
tureS' 4 -distort the communication of private preferences to the political
branches.41 Other imperfections, such as the cost of effectively monitoring
and controlling bureaus, ' further distort the communication of elected
officials' preferences to administrative agencies.
At a minimum, therefore, one would expect external effects to lose in-
view, in SENATE COMM. ON GOV'TAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGU-
LATION, App. TO VOL. VI: FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATION 169, 200-01 (Comm. Print 1978).
235. See, e.g., R. ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: A THEORY OF INFLUENCE
(1979); L. DODD & R. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1979).
236. For illustrations, see W. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES (1967); THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970: ECONOMIC REGULATION AND BUREAUCRATnC BEHAv-
xOR (K. Clarkson & T. Muris eds. 1981); Parnell, Congressional Interference in Ageny EnforcemenL
The IRS Experience, 89 YALE L.J. 1360 (1980).
237. See To Eliminate Age Limitations Presently Imposed on Certain Pilots of Aircraft: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transp., 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 160-64 (testimony of Pilots' Rights Association Panel), 367-69 (1974) (submission of John
Young, legislative vice president, Pilots' Rights Association).
238. See, e.g., W. RIKER, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 61 (2d ed. 1965). Inability to
weigh votes by relative intensity of voter preferences is one of the conditions that produces the problem
of cyclical majorities. See A. MACKAY, ARROW'S THEOREM: THE PARADOX OF SOCIAL CHOICE
26-27, 42-48 (1980).
239. See A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 136 (1957) (noting tendency of
candidates in a two-party system to converge on the midpoint of the voter frequency distribution).
240. See Weingast, Shepsle & Johnsen, The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassi-
cal Approach to Distribution Politics, 89 J. POL. ECON. 642 (1981).
241. For an extreme view, see E. NORDLINGER, ON THE AUTONOMY OF THE DEMOCRATIC
STATE (1981).
242. See J. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 318-24 (1981); W. NIS-
KANEN, supra note 214, at 24-35.
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tensity in the process of political conversion. Consequently, agencies will
tend to value the direct effects (on transaction costs) of their rulemaking
decisions more than their indirect effects (on compliance rate and incon-
gruity effects). To that extent, at least, the predictions advanced in the
preceding section should hold true.
Political conversion often obscures the magnitude of private costs and
benefits. Generally, one would expect difficulty of estimation to increase
with the intensity of conflict in the political arena. The more intense the
conflict, the more confused and unintelligible will be the signals received
by the administrative policymaker. Estimation of the political conse-
quences of alternative strategies will become more difficult, and the per-
ceived political costs of selecting the wrong alternatives will rise. Faced
with this dilemma, the risk-averse policymaker will tend to favor Model
II formulations. Transparent rules tend to spotlight a value choice. Oppo-
nents of that choice will attack the agency's action, forcing the agency to
expend its own resources for defense. Rules having low transparency thus
become more attractive, since they conceal value choices.
Beyond these general observations, predictions about the effect of politi-
cal distortions are difficult. Once again, public choice theory provides
some guidance. 4 ' In the distribution of political influence in the larger
governmental arena-as at the administrative level-organizational costs
are a crucial factor: groups with lower organizational costs will outbid
those with higher costs. To the extent that the resulting distribution of
administrative costs and benefits misrepresents the distribution of social
costs and benefits, rules made by self-serving rulemakers will deviate from
the optimally precise form.
V. CONCLUSION: ADMINISTRATIVE RULE PRECISION FROM THE
JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE
We began this journey at the courthouse, and it is time to return. Rule
precision has importance not simply to administrative policymakers and
their critics but to the courts as well. As the case studies and anecdotes
illustrate, courts are repeatedly drawn into controversies about the appro-
priate precision of administrative rules as they review the legality of ac-
tions predicated upon them. What they need to discharge that function is
neither philosophizing nor modelmaking, but hardheaded guidelines for
adjudicating disputes between the government and the public. When is a
rule so opaque that its application denies a person "due process of
law"?244 When is it an "abuse of discretion" to ground actiops on an
243. See supra pp. 99-101.
244. See, e.g., White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976) (use of unwritten personal stan-
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accretion of ad hoc rationales rather than on a more comprehensive direc-
tive?2 ,4 5 When does the application of a rule become so mechanistic that it
denies an individualized hearing guaranteed by statute? 46 At what point
does its application to borderline cases become arbitrary and capricious
247
or deny equal protection of the law?248
To a large degree, answers to these questions depend on the peculiar
statutory or doctrinal context in which they arise. Regulatory incongrui-
ties that impair speech 49 or disadvantage suspect minorities2 50 will re-
ceive far less tolerance, for instance, than those that burden economic in-
terests. 51 Some statutory schemes will display greater legislative concern
for individualized treatment2 52 or clarity of regulatory exposition 53 than
others.
But even after allowing for such doctrinal or statutory peculiarities,
there still remains an irreducible core of legal controversy about rule pre-
cision that yields only to an indwelling jurisprudential principle of fair-
ness or propriety. The point of this Article has been to elaborate such a
principle-one based on the norm of efficiency-and to explore its appli-
cation as both an evaluative criterion and predictive model. It is not by
any means the only way to think about rule precision, nor perhaps always
the best way. Controversies about the transparency and congruity of cer-
tain rules are perhaps best resolved by a "moral judgment,"'22" "structural
due process," 2' 5 or a "libertarian"25'  model. But in the messy relativistic
world of most administrative policymaking, the tensions between account-
dards in determinations of general assistance eligibility violates due process); Holmes v. New York
City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968) (due process requires that selections among applicants
for public housing be made in accordance with "ascertainable standards").
245. See, e.g., Bahat v. Sureck, 637 F.2d 1315, 1317 (9th Cir. 1981) (INS adjudication found
inconsistent with agency regulations); Ruangswang v. INS, 591 F.2d 39, 46 (9th Cir. 1978) (agency
cannot create new standard and apply it in context of adjudicatory process).
246. See Heckler v. Campbell, 103 S. Ct. 1952 (1983).
247. See WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
248. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 72-74, 80-81 (1979) (addressing permissible
statutory classifications of aliens); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1977) (same); Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641-44 (1973) (citizenship restriction in municipal civil service "sweeps
indiscriminately").
249. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-15 (1973).
250. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 370-73 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race).
251. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); United States v. Carolene Prods., 304
U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938).
252. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
253. See Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 569-71 (9th Cir. 1971).
254. Mashaw, supra note 186, at 188-90.
255. See Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classification and Conclusive Presumptions: Three Linked
Riddles, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 8 (Summer 1975); supra note 33.
256. F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 205-14 (1960); F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM 72 (1944).
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ability and responsiveness, 87 accuracy and fraternity,2 8 and individual-
ism and altruism25 will not often yield to resolution by deontological fiat.
Courts, as much as politicians, must throw competing values on the scales
and somehow total the score.
It is not an easy task, especially for courts. As Jerry Mashaw has force-
fully argued in a different context, courts are ill-equipped for "social-cost
accounting, 2 60 particularly when looking over an administrative poli-
cymaker's shoulder. Not only do courts lack the administrator's presumed
investigative resources, analytic competence, and technical literacy, but
they view social policy issues through the refracting prism of judicial re-
view. Resolving competing claims about the precision of rules in the con-
text of enforcement proceedings requires courts to extrapolate from a sin-
gle known application of a rule to a universe of imagined applications.
Even in a pre-enforcement challenge, the restricted, party-centered empir-
icism of appellate review consigns the court to deciphering that artifact of
litigation known as the "administrative record."2 "
The difficulty of the task counsels broad deference to administrators'
choice of rule, formulations. Not only are administrators better equipped
for "social-cost accounting," but, as the case studies in Section III suggest,
the political "marketplace" can often be relied upon to restrain adminis-
trative excesses. Courts, however, cannot wholly escape their editorial re-
sponsibility, precisely because the formal dimensions of a rule are so inter-
twined with its substantive and procedural legality. If the framework
presented in this Article cautions against excessive judicial intervention, it
also points the way to more productive interventions. Courts should, first
of all, reserve their closest scrutiny for rules least likely to be subject to
effective political discipline. As organization-cost disparities progressively
skew the "reinternalization" of "external" effects, the need for judicial
oversight grows. Our earlier discussion suggests that courts should be most
sensitive to the plaint of the unorganized beneficiary of regulatory protec-
tion and the adversarially disadvantaged public assistance recipient.
When courts are drawn into disputes about regulatory precision, they
should be sensitive to the inevitable tradeoffs among transparency, accessi-
257. See Nonet, The Legitimation of Purposive Decisions, 68 CALIF. L. Rv. 263, 274-77 (1980).
258. See Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE PRo-
cEss, Nomos XVIII, at 126 (1977).
259. See Kennedy, supra note 15.
260. Mashaw, supra note 147, at 1435-36, 1447-49; see also Mashaw, The Supreme Court's
Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CH. L. REv. 28 (1976).
261. See Auerbach, Informal Rule Making A Proposed Relationship Between Administrative
Procedures and Judicial Review, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 15 (1977); Pedersen, Formal Records and Infor-
mal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38 (1975); Verkuil,Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA.
L. REv. 185 (1974).
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bility, and congruence. They should look for evidence of the factors that
drive rules toward one extreme or the other-for example, the high social
costs of misspecification error associated with rules of reason, the large
rule application costs and quality control problems associated with per se
rules. Prohibitory rules should presumptively be more transparent than
licensure rules, liability rules more transparent than remedial rules, exter-
nal rules more transparent than internal rules. Incongruent outcomes
should be more tolerable when they appear to cluster near the boundary
than at the extremes. In many ways, of course, homilies like this misrep-
resent the complexity of the subject. But they serve to remind us that
"social-cost accounting," for all its intimidating connotations, is really the
sophisticated and sensitive application of common sense. As applied to the
art of regulatory rulewriting, it is a business too important to leave en-
tirely to the accountants.
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